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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the explanation for young children's
failure on Piagetian concrete-operations tests. The issue is of
considerable importance because it relates directly to the process by
which a child becomes capable of concrete-operational thinking.
We investigate a claim that, contrary to Piaget's view, young
children may fail on the tests because they are misled about the
reference of the critical questions by the non-verbal communicative
contexts. It is suggested that young children could be in the habit
of giving only non-literal interpretations to test instructions. Non-
literal interpretations are constructed primarily on the basis of what
the context of utterance suggests. Where these interpretations do
not correspond with the intended literal interpretation of experiment¬
er's meaning, the children will be misled about the reference of the
test instructions and will give incorrect responses based on the
incorrect interpretations.
We try to account for young children giving only non-literal
interpretations in terms of the evidence that children depend on their
sensitivity to social situations for the development of language, and
for responding to linguistic expressions which are only partially
grasped. We review studies by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975) and
McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes (1978) who proposed that situational
clues cause young children to give incorrect interpretations and
incorrect responses in the Conservation and Class Inclusion tests
respectively.
We report experiments carried out to further investigate the new
account. These experiments involved a test (Tower test) which was new
but which was similar to one of the Piagetian tests (Conservation test)
in design. The young children studied "behaved in the manner predicted
"by the new account of their failure, giving considerable weight to what
the situation of the test suggested about the experimenter's intention
for the critical question asked. This resulted in responses which we
termed Yes-responses. The responses given where less weight was
assigned to the situational suggestion were termed No-responses. The
results of a later experiment showed that the same children who give
the supposedly more context-dependent non-conserving responses on the
Conservation test are the ones who give Yes-responses on the new test.
Similarly, the children who give conserving responses on the
Conservation test are more likely to give No-responses on the new test.
However, our final experiment led to the important discovery that
young children do not assign preferential weight to situational
suggestions where the expression to be interpreted has more determinate
reference than the ones encountered in the Tower test or the conservat¬
ion question. This result indicated that the key to the children's
difficulty might reside in the particular expressions used in these
tests - the deictic term 'them' (Tower test) and the quantitative term
'more' (Conservation test) which behaves in a manner similar to deictics.
In the conclusions, we propose an account of the developmental
transition from non-conserving to conserving responses in terms of our
speculations about the change from Yes-responses on the Tower test to
No-responses. This account centres on the indeterminacy surrounding
the key expressions in these tests and explains the developmental
change by appealing both to a decreasing reliance on non-verbal clues
and to a restriction of the indeterminacy of these terms imposed on them
by the five-year old child.
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Introduction and General Theoretical Background
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with a claim that, contrary to Piaget's
view, the so-called pre-operational child may fail on Piaget's concrete-
operations tests simply because the child is misled about the
experimenter's intended referent for the critical questions by the
non-verbal communicative contexts of the questions. Specifically,
the child gives considerable weight to what the non-verbal contexts
of communication suggest about the experimenter's intentions. 'Where
such suggestions conflict with speech, the child arrives at
interpretations which are at variance with intended literal
interpretations. Consequently, incorrect responses are produced.
Piaget's claim is that the preoperational child fails such tests
only because of his incapacity to carry out the intellectual decentring
required by the tests. Decentring involves taking into account and
coordinating several important aspects of an object of reasoning
itself, such that objective judgements are reached which are
independent of the reasoner's own point of view or situation.
Children referred to as 'preoperational' are 2 to 7 years of age,
and the term denotes the second of the four main cognitive developmental
stages postulated by Piaget. Concrete-operations tasks test for the
presence of certain special rational abilities which were believed by
Piaget to develop at the beginning of the succeeding concrete-
operations stage. According to him, the abilities are made possible
essentially by the development of particular cognitive structures which
he described as logico-mathematical.
2.
1.1.1 The Motivation for the Study
The preoperational child's failure on the concrete-operations
tasks relates directly to the process "by which he becomes capable of
concrete-operational thinking. Thus, if we are able to give a
correct account for the child's failure at this stage, development to
the concrete-operations stage will be explained. This is why great
importance is attached to investigation of this question and a need is
felt to have an account of the critical change which is as. accurate
as possible.
It would only be natural to ask why an account should be
considered which differs from Piaget's existing one.
In recent years, the evidence on which Piaget based his account
has been challenged. He took it for granted that the so-called
preoperational children do not possess the special abilities which
the concrete-operations tasks test, and it happens that his observat¬
ions depend in large part on this assumption. A number of studies
carried out with modified versions of some of Piaget's tasks suggest
that children (especially I4 to 7 year olds) who fail the original
forms of the tasks may not, in fact, lack the abilities which the
tasks are supposed to test; hence our use of the qualification
'so-called' for the term 'preoperational' taken to describe their
stage of development. We shall use the alternative term 'young
children' to characterize this age group.
As a result of these more recent studies, a number of alternative
explanations have been put forward for children's failure on the
Conservation Tasks, the Class Inclusion Tasks, and the Spatial
Perspective Tasks. The one being considered in this thesis was
first put forward for the first two tasks by McGarrigle and Donaldson
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(1975)» and- McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes (1978) respectively.
This explanation recognizes the inherent communicative function
underlying speech. This is different from the approach of Piaget
who emphasized the representative function of language. (Piaget and
Inhelder (1969))* In the communicational approach, it is considered
that there is more to speech than the mere utterance of linguistic
units symbolizing thought operations. We use speech to communicate
messages about experience and purpose, and because speech is
relative to a rich consciousness of surroundings, the same sentence
may be used to communicate different messages in different circumstan¬
ces. Interpretation of speech, therefore, necessarily involves
taking into account the entire perceived context of speech (real or
imagined).
The important implication of the above view of how communication
functions is that we may not always grasp the message of an utterance
even though we know what its words denote. There is considerable
room for misunderstanding. Specifically, we may take the context
of an utterance into account in such a way that we cannot understand
its intended message.
Further details of the close relationship which exists between
messages understood and the contexts of utterances in normal circum¬
stances, as well as how this relationship can work against young
children in test situations, will be given later in this chapter.
First, we shall discuss Piaget's work in more detail, beginning with
a general account of his theory of cognitive development. Among
other things, this will help us to appreciate better the kind of
relationship which exists between his claim and the present
alternative.
i+.
1.2.1 The Piagetian Theory of Cognitive Development
A cognitive developmental psychologist "begins by trying to
identify the outstanding differences between the 'average' adult
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and the 'average' child. He then goes on to try to explain the
processes whereby the child overcomes the differences. For
Piaget and many other psychologists, an outstanding difference
between the adult and the child is that the adult can deal
effectively with the non-present, and with the hypothetical. To
quote from Flavell's book on Piaget's work and ideas, "His
conceptual world is full of informal theories about self and life,
full of plans for his and society's future, in short full of
ideation which goes far beyond his immediate situation, current
interpersonal dealings, and so on." Flavell, 19^3> P» 223-
The Young child, on the other hand, deals largely with the
present; with the here and now. It follows
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that an account of cognitive development is essentially an account
of how the child becomes able to deal with the non-present and the
hypothetical.
According to Piaget, a major factor which makes for the change
is the development of the symbolic function. This is the function
which allows the individual to mahe representations of objects and
events in his environment. The representations are made in
different forms, for example; deferred imitation, mental imagery,
symbolic games, drawing and language. The different forms do not
all appear at the same time in development, and each one continues
to undergo changes in its quality, but, according to Piaget, they
all spring from the same source in development.
The development of the general symbolic function commences when
the child begins towards the end of the second year to internalize
his transformed and properly organized sensorimotor actions.
(Sensorimotor actions become transformed as a result of their
application to a variety of objects.) The development marks the
end of the first major stage - the Sensorimotor stage. It also
marks the beginning of the Preoperational stage. (for details of
the first stage, see Piaget, 1952a, 1951+ and 1951.)
As development proceeds, the internalized actions themselves
undergo transformations, becoming more and more divested of their
concrete substantial qualities. The actions also become organized
into systems or structures. These are the so-called cognitive
structures. The term 'operational1 is used by Piaget to refer to
an internalized action which is an integral part of an organized
network of related actions. It is not until the end of the
preoperational stage, or the beginning of the Concrete-operations
stage, that internalized actions become properly organized as well
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as reversible. This explains the name "pre-operational'.
The networks of internalized actions being what they are, make
it possible for the developing child to reason about or take into
account several aspects of the environment at the same time; that is,
to decentre with respect to representations.
However, it is not until the Formal operations stage (the final
major stage of development - from about 11-g- years) that the child,
now an adolescent, begins to represent the^ mon—actual. In spite of
his huge developments, the structuring and organizing activity of
the concrete-operations child is oriented mainly towards real or con¬
crete objects and events in the immediate present; hence the name
'concrete' operations. (For details of the last three stages, see
Piaget, 1926; 1928; 1929; 1930; 1950; 1952a; 1952b; Piaget and
Inhelder, 1956; Piaget, 1957; Inhelder and Piaget, 1958).
The cognitive structures formed during the concrete and formal
operations stages are described as logico-mathematical because Piaget
believed that certain logico-mathematical structures make good models
of the actual organization and processes in cognitive structures.
He sees the two, that is, operational thought and logico-mathematical
structures, as having important properties in common. For the
concrete-operations stage, Piaget arrived at nine cognitive structures
which he called groupings. The grouping is a hybrid of two logico-
mathematical structures - the group and the lattice. The nine
groupings are viewed as models for cognition in several different
realms of intellectual behaviour. They underlie the special
abilities like conservation, class inclusion, and coordination of
perspectives. Conservation ability, for example, expresses the
seventh of the nine groupings which allows for the multiplication
of relations. The ability to conserve, therefore, involves basically
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the one-to-one multiplication of relations. Class inclusion, on the
other hand, is identified with the first of the groupings which allows
for the primary addition of classes.
Even though the special abilities and the underlying cognitive
structures were believed to be absent before the concrete operations
stage, the tasks which are designed to test for their presence are
given to preoperational children with the expectation that the
children's behaviour on the tasks will throw some light on the
changes which make for the important development to operational
thinking. The account given by Piaget of the children's behaviour
on the tasks is more or less a confirmation of his theory, and we
shall illustrate this with reference to the Conservation and Class
Inclusion Tasks.
1.2.2 Conservation
The Conservation Task tests for the presence of the ability to
conserve quantity, (Piaget, 195>2b; Piaget and Inhelder,
This ability is considered to be one of the major requirements of
adult reasoning, with various kinds of quantity being conserved;
for example, number, length, liquid quantity, weight and area.
The Conservation Task can be seen as consisting of two main
parts. To begin with, two equal quantities of material (for example,
water in liquid quantity task, thread or thin strips of wood in
length task, plasticine in weight or matter task) are presented to
the subject. The amounts are made to give the same perceptual
impression, and the subject is asked whether the two are equal with
respect to their critical attribute. If he makes the correct
judgement, the experimenter proceeds to the second part of the test,
in which the experimenter transforms one of the two quantities to
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create perceptual differences between them. In the number task,
for example, the items in one row are moved either further apart from
each other or closer together. This transformation creates length
and density differences between the two rows.
It is usual for the experimenter explicitly to invite the subject
to pay attention to the making of the transformation by saying, 'Now
watch what I do'. The transformation is followed by a second request
to compare the two quantities.
According to Piaget, conservation in these circumstances
requires the individual to coordinate the perceptual differences
between the task quantities. In other words, he is required to
decentre. The kind of coordination required will necessarily
involve making a representation of the problem and mentally
reversing the transformation action to return the quantities to
the initial correspondence state in thought.
As already indicated, young children commonly give non-conserving
responses on the tasks; that is, they change their pre-transformation
judgement of the task quantities. (See, for example, Bodwell (i960),
Elkind (1961), Hood (1962) and Smedslund (196I+).) Piaget took the
responses as an indication that the conservation ability is absent
from the children. This is a very reasonable deduction in the
circumstances, and it was perhaps inevitable that Piaget should see
the question of why the children behave as they do as being essentially
one of why the ability is absent from them. According to him, they
give non-conserving responses because they are not capable of
co-ordinating the perceptual differences between the conservation
quantities. They are not capable of making the necessary represent¬
ations and mentally reversing the act of transformation.
Apart from the fact of their failure to give conserving responses,
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the nature of the behaviour which young children exhibit on the
tasks does help to give the impression that they experience a
difficulty with decentring. They appear to be stuck to the
perceptual differences between the quantities given. Piaget
described this as egocentrism. He judged the children's behaviour
to be one of a failure to reason. According to him, rather than
considering all the perceptual differences together, the children
attend to or centre on the differences separately. This behaviour
is believed to result in an impression on their part that the
quantities become unequal after transformation; hence, their
non-conserving responses. On the number task, for example, they
centre either on the difference between the densities of the rows
of counters or on the difference between the lengths. On the
liquid task, they centre either on the difference between the
heights/levels of the quantities of liquid in the containers, or on
the difference between the widths/sizes of the containers, or even
on the number of containers into which each quantity is poured.
Apparently, the difference centred on at any one moment is
the most outstanding or the salient one, and children's judgement
of which quantity is more than the other changes as the salient
difference changes. It is believed that the children are not aware
of a conflict between their judgements, or at least they are not
bothered by the conflicts. It is explained that this is made
possible by the fact that they actually believe that quantities can
increase or decrease even when nothing is added or taken away from
them. Piaget explained that conserving responses are given once
the conflicts come to be recognized, and when they are resolved by
the children's understanding the relationship between the properties
or differences centred upon. In other words, conserving responses
are given once the children are able to decentre in their thinking
and make a proper representation of the problem. This change makes
it possible for them mentally to coordinate the differences and
reverse the transformation action to return to the initial
correspondence state.
Piaget did consider the possibility that young children give
non-conserving responses for reasons other than the one which he
proposed. Specifically, he considered the possibility that the
children do not understand the conservation question. But, as
for the other alternative explanations which he considered, Piaget
regarded this as an equivalent explanation. Shown below is a
typical comment by him on the matter. The comment was made in
the context of a liquid quantity task, and the subjects were I4 and
5 year olds.
"It might of course be argued that the child
may not really have grasped the question.
Does he always understand that it refers to
the total quantity, or does he think he is
merely being asked about changes in the
number, level or size of the glasses? But
the problem is precisely to discover whether
the child is capable of grasping a quantity
as being a whole, as a result of the
co-ordination of the various relationships
he perceives. The fact that these children
isolated one of these relationships may
therefore be due as much to lack of
understanding of the notions in question
as to failure to grasp the verbal question."
Piaget, 1952b, p.8-9.
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Surely, if grasping the reference of the conservation question
is one and the same thing as understanding the notions involved in
conservation, then the conservation test is no more than a test
of the child's linguistic skill. But knowledge of what the words
used in the conservation question denote cannot he a necessary condition
for conservation ability. It is only one of the necessary conditions
for manifestation of the ability which is a separable issue, and
which, when absent, will lead to non-conserving responses in spite of
the presence of conservation ability. However, before we pursue
our criticism any further, we shall go on to consider the
Class Inclusion Test.
1.2.3 Class Inclusion
The Class Inclusion Task tests for the presence of the ability
to make the simultaneous comparison of the whole of a class with a
part of it (inhelder and Piaget, I96I4; Piaget, 1952b). As for
conservation ability, class-inclusion ability is believed to be
one of the major requirements for adult thinking.
The material used for the class-inclusion task varies.
Commonly it comprises beads, pictures of flowers and toy animals.
Where flowers, for example, are used, the whole class to be compared
could be defined by the primary attribute of flowers, while the
subclasses are defined by the type attribute or by colour. Where
beads are used, the whole class could be defined by the material
attribute of wood or glass, and the subclasses by colour or shape.
The subclasses are made to be numerically unequal, and often, the
numerical difference is varied for the same child over a number of
trials.
For descriptive purposes the whole class is often represented
by the letter B, and the subclasses by A and A' . The
question given demands the subject to compare the size of B with
the size of A , the bigger subclass. It is believed that this
comparison will entail the simultaneous consideration and
coordination of the following two relations (one being the
reverse of the other)
(i) The whole class is made up of the two subclasses;
that is, B = A + A' ,
(ii) The larger subclass (A) is the part of the whole
class which is left over when the smaller subclass
is subtracted from it; that is, A = B - A' .
According to Piaget, it is only through such reasoning that it
will be recognized that the whole is greater than either of its
parts (or B > A). As for the conservation tasks, the subject
will need to overcome the influences of perceptual differences.
He will need, for example, to ignore the differences between the
subclasses to consider the whole class.
Young children commonly fail to give inclusion judgements;
that is, they deny that the whole class is larger than one of the
parts. As for the conservation tasks, Piaget took the non-inclusion
judgements as an indication that the children do not have the
inclusion ability. As for those tasks, therefore, he saw the question
of why the children give the judgements as essentially one of why the
ability is absent from them. He claimed that even though they know
that the whole class is made up of the two subclasses, they forget
the whole class as soon as they think of the subclasses. And as
soon as they think of the whole class, they forget the subclasses.
In other words, they are not able to coordinate the relations between
the classes. This is said to be due mainly to an inability to
reverse the two relations given above; that is, they cannot reverse
B = A + A' to arrive at A = B - A' or reverse A = B - A' to
arrive at B = A + A'. In' one word, the children are not capable
of the mental operations required for class inclusion.
Again, as for the conservation tasks, the behaviour exhibited by
the children on the Inclusion Task gives an impression that they have
a genuine difficulty with decentring or coordinating the necessary
relations. On questioning about the task, they commonly state that
there are more of the larger subclass than the whole class because
there are only a few of the other subclass. This goes to show that
what the children compare are the two subclasses, and not the whole
class and the larger subclass as directed. In view of the fact
that the same children, on being questioned, agree that the whole
class is made up of the two subclasses, the behaviour-of comparing
the subclasses would seem to show that they become attracted to the
perceptual attributes which define the subclasses. Piaget took the
behaviour to indicate that the children are egocentric; that is,
they immediately centre on the perceptual attributes, and he explained
that this behaviour is what makes it impossible for them to achieve
the cognitive operations required for success on the task. Again,
this explanation implies a failure to reason about the task.
Piaget believed that inclusion judgements are given once
children become capable of making a proper representation of the
problem, and when they start to decentre in their thinking about
the potentialities of the test situation. When this happens, the
coordination of the relations which exist between a whole class and
its subclasses becomes possible for them. Piaget considered and
dismissed the possibility that children's non-inclusion judgements
could result from a failure to -understand the Inclusion question.
For him, the development of the ability to decentre is the only
important change which makes for the transition to the concrete-
operational stage. Piaget wrote, for example:
"It might of course be argued that the child's
difficulty in mentally constructing two
simultaneous sets is not due to the
irreversibility of his thought, as we have
just suggested, but merely to lack of under¬
standing of his instructions. Might he not
think that two necklaces were actually to be
made with the same material? It was
precisely with this possibility in mind that
we finally used two sets of beads in two
separate boxes, and as we have seen, this
technique made little difference to the
result. The difficulty is therefore not
due to verbal misunderstanding."
Piaget, 1952b., p. 179
(The material referred to in the comment are beads, and in an attempt
to make the inclusion question more meaningful, subjects had been
told to imagine that necklaces would be made from the beads.)
In another section of the particular chapter from which the above
comment is taken, Piaget had written:
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"It thus seems to be the relationship of
inclusion that is the stumbling-block for
these children. For them, wholes are not
logical classes, but elementary schemata
of assimilation or syncretic aggregates, in
which the relation between the part and the
whole is not yet a quantitative relationship,
or even 'intensively' quantifiable, i.e.
there is neither part nor inclusion, but
merely qualitative participation."
Piaget, 1952b, p. 171
It is important to note that Piaget was led to present the
inclusion task with two sets of beads (first quotation above).
According to his own report, young children perform on this version
of the task as they do on the original version with one set of
2
beads. The point is that this second task is not an inclusion
task. It involves a comparison of non-included sets. This
being the case, the fact that children behave on it as they do on
the proper inclusion task is an indication that the stumbling-block
for this age group on the task may not be the relationship of inclusion.
1.2.I+ Language Development and Operational Thinking
Piaget's account of the development of operational thought
does not attribute any significant role to language. By suggesting
that young children behave as they do on his tasks only because of
difficulty with decentring, and never because of difficulty with
the test questions, Piaget was in effect suggesting that development
in language was not very important for concrete-operational
development. This is contrary to what the present alternative
claim would suggest, and it is therefore necessary to elaborate on
the matter.
Piaget noted that representational thought or symbolic
functioning does not begin with and result from the incorporation
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of verbal signs from the social environment. The first symbols
or signifiers, according to him, are the private, non-verbal
symbols which emerge towards the end of the sensorimotor stage,
and which come into being through the internalization of imitation
in the form of image signifiers. What is suggested is that
language behaviour is a dependent variable, with general cognitive
development as the independent variable. (See Piaget, 1926, 1951*)
It is not only at the initial stages that Piaget took language
to be entirely dependent on general cognitive development, the
relationship was believed to persist right up to the concrete
operations stage. (See, for example, Inhelder and Piaget, 196i|.)
Logical operations, he said, result from coordinations among actions
and not from language. Piaget would readily agree that language
helps to free representation from its reliance on immediate action.
He would also agree that language indefinitely extends the power of
logical operations, and confers on them a mobility and universality
which they would not have otherwise. But he still maintained that
right up to the end of the concrete-operations stage, language
merely reflects thought. In other words, language depends entirely
for its development on the formation of the different cognitive
schemata or structures which he postulated. Under such circumstan¬
ces, it will be inconceivable to regard language as having any
significant part to play in development before the formal
operations stage.
1.2.5 Genevan Research on the Role of Language and Contrary Evidence
There have been a number of experimental studies, as well as
ordinary comparative analyses which support Piaget's position on
language. Most of these come from workers in Geneva.
17.
Sinclair (1971)> example, identified some sensorimotor
schemes which she felt could account for initial language development.
The child's ability to classify in action, for example, was given as
being responsible for the later ability to place linguistic elements
into the major categories like noun phrase and verb phrase. The
ability to relate objects and actions to one another, on the other
hand, was given as" being responsible for the functional grammatical
relations such as 'subject of' and 'object of'.
In addition to the comparative analyses of the nature of early
language and sensorimotor structures, Sinclair (19^9) also conducted
experimental studies of the relationship between language and
cognition during the preoperational and concrete operations stages.
She compared conserving and non-conserving children on the use and
understanding of comparative terms applicable to quantity. These
terms are used in Conservation Tasks. She found that the conservers
were more likely than the non-conservers to use somewhat more complex
comparative terms. This correlation was taken as an indication that
the correct use of the terms is closely linked to operational progress.
Sinclair also tried to teach the non-conservers the kinds of
comparative expressions which they had not produced previously. This
attempt was met with some success, but the coaching was ineffective in
bringing about the acquisition of the conservation skills which the
children had lacked before it. This result was taken by Sinclair to
confirm the independence of logical operations from language development.
She wrote, for example,
"These Genevan results, together with the results of the research
on deaf and blind children mentioned earlier, confirm Piaget's
view on the role of language in the constitution of
intellectual operations: language is not the source of logic,
but is on the contrary structured by logic."
Sinclair, 19^9» P«325
Piaget too acclaimed these results and wrote that,
"Linguistic progress is not responsible for logical
or operational progress. It is rather the other
way round. The logical or operational level is
likely to be responsible for a more sophisticated
language level."
Piaget, 1972, p.1l+
Results similar to Sinclair's were obtained by Inhelder (1969)5
and Ferreiro and Sinclair (1971). The two studies involved the
cognitive operation of reversibility. Inhelder's study was
concerned with seriation ability - arranging different sized
items in increasing or decreasing order and being able to start
off the ordering from any one of the items. The ability is
believed to depend on the child knowing that any particular one
of such items is both bigger (fatter, longer) than some of the
other items in the series, and smaller (thinner, shorter) than
others. As for Sinclair's study, Inhelder found that only
children who had nearly reached the operational stage were able
to use the appropriate linguistic terms (comparatives) for
describing the relations between the items (sticks) in her series.
While it has not been denied that sensorimotor structures
must have some part to play in initial language development, some
serious criticisms have been levelled against the Genevan studies
of later developments. It has been noted that the conclusions
arrived at by Sinclair need not have been drawn from that data.
(Fodor, Bever, and Garret, 197^)- Another worker with a different
view could draw a very different conclusion from the same results.
Other investigators have drawn attention to the fact that
Sinclair's conservers were older than her non-conservers. This
makes her conclusions doubtful. The difference which she found
between conservers and the non-conservers in the use of complex or
appropriate comparative terms may have been due more to age and
experience than to the differences in operational level of thinking
(Moore and Harris, 1978).
Moreover, the original findings have not always been replicated.
To give an example, Moore and Harris (1978) compared children (3
years 5 months to 8 years 11 months) on the ability to reverse
relationships in thought about objects and to apply the same
operation in language constructions. The Conservation Tasks were
used to test the former while the passive construction was used to
test the latter. The investigators found a number of non-conserving
children who could, however, 'understand the passive sentence
structure.
Scholnick and Adams (1973) also compared children on the same
abilities as Moore and Harris (although they used a matrix-
permutation task to test reversibility in thought). They did not
find many children being capable of reversibility in language before
they were able to do so in thought, as did Moore and Harris, but
neither did they find the reverse to be true. What is suggested
is that there is no conclusive evidence that cognitive developments
must precede development of the same abilities in language.
Further important data has come to light which shows Piaget's
extreme view to be inaccurate. The evidence is of two main kinds.
The first is the finding that there are developments in
language which cannot be attributed to the maturing cognitive
processes in any direct manner. The linguistic developments,
moreover, do not necessarily serve the child better in saying what
he has to say. They are simply more complex than initial forms.
Such a finding was made, for example, for the development of
self-reference in a study of pronominalization (formation of
pronouns). (Bellugi-Klima, 1969 - cited by Cromer, 197U; and
Bellugi, 1971)' Furthermore, it has been found that some linguistic
structures are not developed for quite some time after the cognitive
counterparts have been developed. The language forms resist
acquisition because of their grammatical complexity. This is
seen to advantage in the case of some bilingual children. Slobin
(1973) cites the example of two girls learning both Serbo-Croatian
and Hungarian. The Serbo-Croatian expressions for spatial
locations are more complex than the Hungarian forms. It was found
for the girls in question that they were able to express the concepts
in Hungarian before they were able to do so in Serbo-Croatian. The
fact that the concepts were expressed at all in one language was
an indication that they were already developed in the children's
thinking. The fact that they were not expressed in the other
language indicated that linguistic structures may resist acquisition
in spite of appropriate cognitive gains.
The second type of evidence in conflict with Piaget's concept
of cognitive primacy relative to language concerns the very early
stages of development. Studies of pre-linguistic communication,
analysing data from mother-infant interaction sessions at home or
in the laboratory, have revealed that many skills of communication
are mastered by the child in the pre-linguistic period which are
necessary for later language development. Essentially, the infant
learns many non-linguistic conventions about the appropriate use of
words.
The studies, like the claim of this thesis, are animated by
the view that language is a tool which we use to do things and to
cooperate in doing them. We use language to communicate purposes
and to share knowledge. As we noted at the beginning of the
chapter, and as the account of his theory of development makes
clear, Piaget views language essentially as a symbolic system for
representing knowledge. While this is one very important function
of language, a neglect of the other communicative functions leads,
according to the alternative approach, to a distorted view about
how the child initially understands or uses language.
The important evidence from the above studies of early
communication is that even at the very beginning, development of
functions of language is not entirely dependent on the prior
formation of a general symbolic function. The pre-linguistic
child is learning to communicate and to share knowledge well before
he begins to master language. He already communicates by non¬
verbal means. When he begins to use language proper, therefore,
he has already mastered several aspects of what language is used
to do.
Many of the investigators of pre-linguistic communication
emphasize the fact that the pre-linguistic developments described
will be impossible without the child's active interaction with the
mother or other caretaker. This is not something which Piaget's
account of initial development would lead one to expect. Piaget
emphasizes the role of the coordination and internalization by the
child alone of many different action schemes which contribute to
the development of a general symbolic function. Furthermore,
the action schemes described by Piaget are directed more towards
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impersonal objects and less toward other people.
In addition to the fact that the kind of developments described
depend essentially on the child's interaction with other persons, they
also seem to express a kind of innate willingness on the part of the
child to master such activities. (For details of the evidence
concerning the communicative abilities of infants, see the following -
Trevarthen, 197^4* 7977» 1979a, 1979t>, 1980; Bruner, 1975a, 1975b,
1978a, 1978b; Ninio and Bruner, 1978; Ryan, 1973» 197U;
Bates, 1976; Snow, 1978, Lieven, 1978» Ryan, 1978).
The important implication of the evidence concerning the
relative independence of language, both at the very beginning and in
later development, is that, contrary to Piaget's view, failure on his
concrete-operations tests may be brought about by failure to understand
the questions given.^ Furthermore, it is necessary to be more
specific about what we mean by 'understanding' test questions. There
are two senses in which one may understand a sentence. One may know
what the words of the sentence denote or one may grasp the message
which a speaker uses the sentence to convey. TJnder normal circum¬
stances, we are interested in the message of a sentence spoken by
another person and this is true of test situations as well. However,
knowledge of linguistic sentence meaning, while essential, is not
sufficient condition for grasping the message of an utterance. In
fact, failure in grasping speech messages is quite common and there
is no reason why it should be ruled out for Piagetian tests. To
fully appreciate how this failure may occur we must consider in
detail how language functions as communication,
1.3.1 The Communicational Approach to Language - Speech Act Theory
As already indicated, this approach has it that we use language
to do things; hence the term 'Speech Act'. We use language to
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communicate purposes to each other. The same sentence may be used
to signify different wishes or inclinations in different contexts.
Our understanding of sentences in communication situations is,
therefore, sensitive to the contexts in which they are spoken.
An interest in the concept of speech acts necessarily involves
the researcher in an attempt to specify those aspects of speech
contexts or situations which may influence the achievement of
different kinds of communication.
In general, such contextual aspects may be placed in three broad
categories: (1) linguistic, (2) paralinguistic, and (3) extralinguistic.
Aspects of the linguistic context of an utterance include the
intonation pattern and the amount of stress placed on the different
words. The sentences spoken prior to the particular sentence to be
interpreted together with their intonation and stress patterns also
form part of the linguistic context.
The aspects of speech contexts commonly described as paralinguistic
include level or loudness of voice, gestures, head-nods, facial express¬
ions, eye-movements, the angle at which people sit or stand in relation
to each other (orientation), posture, age, sex, appearance and level of
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authority of speaker.
The extralinguistic aspects of the context of an utterance are
the impersonal physical aspects. These include the characteristics
of objects present and/or referred to; for example, the shapes, sizes
and colours. Also included is the arrangement or relations between
the objects; the nature, order and intensity of any events affecting
the objects.
Speech situations differ in the extent to which they involve
the different aspects listed above. One kind of situation in which
many of the aspects come into force is where the participants have
physical views of each other and. the objects and events being
discussed are physically present. This kind of interaction is commonly
referred to as face-to-face conversation and may be compared with a
telephone conversation which does not concern any real objects and
events. In this latter case, paralinguistic and extralinguistic
features play a considerably reduced role in the interpretation of
messages. With regard to a telephone conversation concerning real
objects and events, extralinguistic features play an important
role but a lot is left to the imagination and the past experiences
of the listener. He is left to construct the extralinguistic
context (if not the paralinguistic context as well) in his head.
The same can be said for a face-to-face interaction where the
objects and events discussed are not present.
The past experiences of the listener (and, therefore, the
concepts which he has developed about the nature of the world),
are no less important in determining the message deduced in those
circumstances where the objects and events discussed are physically
present. The assumptions which the listener makes about them
are partly dependent on such experiences. This is a most
important point to beam in mind, and it accounts for the relative
consistency in the individual's interpretative structuring of
different situations during a particular period of his development.
See, for example, Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956).
Having considered in a very general manner the communicational
approach to language, as well as the contextual factors which
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influence the comprehension of messages, we should give some account
of proposals which first introduced the approach in the philosophy
of language. The particular works which have "been chosen for
discussion are those "by Austin (19^2) and Grice (1957> 1968).
1.3.2 Austin
Austin (1962) attacked an established assumption in philosophy
that to say something is always and simply to state something. He
pointed to cases where this assumption was false and he suggested
instead that very often, to say something is to do something;
that is, one performs an act by speaking in that way.
Utterances of this kind were described by Austin as performatives,
and were contrasted at first with utterances which were supposed to be
mere statements or descriptions; that is, constatives.
Among the examples of performatives, Austin gave the following
two utterances:
'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth1
'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow'.
The individual who makes the second utterance, for example, is
not just making a statement or emitting words, he enters into an
agreement with his listener.
Austin went on to note that the speaker may not always succeed
in achieving the action which he tries to perform with his utterance.
To quote him on the matter, he wrote that:
"Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called
performative, a good many other things have as a
general rule to be right and to go right if we are
to be said to have happily brought off our action."
(my underlining) Austin, 19&2, p. 11+
According to Austin, the circumstances of the performative
utterance have to be appropriate to its making. The person who
says 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', for example, could
only actually (or in deed) have named the ship if (among other
things) he is the person appointed to name her. For the person who
says !I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow', the bet only takes
effect if the rules which govern betting are complied with.
Another example given by Austin is the utterance 'I give it
(a gift) to you'. When someone says this, but does not hand over
anything or make arrangements to do so, he does not effectively
give a gift.
When the circumstances of an utterance are not appropriate to
its making, the speaker can only be said to have said something.
He cannot be said to have done something in saying what he said.
Austin then went on to consider some of the factors which may
have to be satisfied for the happy consummation of performative
utterances in general. The list given by him is reproduced below.
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having
a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include
the uttering of certain words by certain persons in
certain circumstances, and further,
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case
must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular
procedure invoked.
(B.1) The prodecure must be executed by all participants both
correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(T.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by
persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the
inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of
any participant, then a person participating in and so
invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or
feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct
themselves, and further
(T.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
Austin's proposal took a very important turn when he abandoned
the distinction between performatives and constatives. He
recognized soon enough that the making of a statement itself is an
act, and any statement can actually be judged on the same criteria
which he had listed for the so-called performatives; that is,
appropriateness of context or circumstances. Also, the so-called
performatives can be judged as true or false. These are criteria
which he initially considered as relevant only to the so-called
constatives.
Austin consequently turned his attention to the question of
the different senses of 'doing something' by any statement. The
act of saying in itself was dubbed 'locutionary act'. The
different acts which may be performed as a result of saying things
were described as 'illocutionary acts'. These illocutionary acts
include the following:
asking or answering a question,
giving some information or an assurance or a warning,
announcing a verdict or an intention,
pronouncing a sentence,
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism,
making an identification or giving a description.
In addition to the distinction between locutionary and
illocutionary acts, Austin also distinguished between the illocution¬
ary force of an utterance and its meaning. Behind this distinction
is the observation that the same utterance may be used in different
ways on different occasions. One of the examples given by Austin
is the utterance 'It is going to charge'. Where explosives are
concerned, for example, it will make a big difference for the
listener whether the utterance is a warning or whether it is merely
information (that is, it will charge and go off sometime, but not now)
As for illocutionary acts in general, illocutionary forces are
determined in part by the circumstances in which they are exerted.
The example given above can be used to illustrate this.
As may be expected, there has been some controversy over the
accuracy of Austin's analyses. (See, for example, Searle, 1968).
However, the basic notions have been well received. These, in
summary, are that there is more to speech than the mere utterance
of linguistic units with factual import. Apart from the ordinary
meaning of an utterance, there is what we do in making the utterance.
Also, the acts which we perform in making utterances are partly
dependent on the circumstances which surround them.
1.3.3 Grice
Grice (1957> 1968) considered it necessary to distinguish
between two notions of meaning.
The first one involves specifying what someone means by making
an utterance x , and it was called occasion-meaning.
The second notion of meaning involves specifying what an
utterance X means. This was called timeless - meaning.
As regards occasion meaning, Grice did not restrict the term
'utterance® to speech alone. X could be an action, for example.
What is important is for x to mean something.
Grice tried to account for occasion meaning by means of a
complex interaction of intentions on the part of both the speaker
and the listener. Specifically, someone, U , means something by
an utterance x , if by the utterance he,
i^) intends to produce in A (listener) a certain
response, r , and
ip) intends that A shall recognize his intention i^ , and
i^) intends that this recognition on the part of A shall
function as A's reason (or part of his reason) for the
response, r .
The intentions considered are factors outside the utterance x
itself, and one can only expect that a speaker may have to employ
contextual aids (linguistic and non-linguistic) to make the
intentions known.
According to Grice, without the proposed intentions (explicit
or implicit), someone cannot be given to mean something by uttering
something.
The analysis has come under attack from other workers. Some
have merely added conditions to those given by Grice. Strawson
(196L1.), for example, suggested that in addition to the above three
intentions, someone, U , should i^) intend that A should
recognise his intention (i£) that A shall recognize his intention
1 . .
1
However, other workers have characterized the whole account as
grossly misleading. (Ziff, 1971). The main point of this
criticism is that the theory or analysis fails to take account of
all instances of meaning. Some or all of the intentions specified
by Grice and Strawson may not be recognized, and yet someone might
still be taken by a listener to mean something. (And such meaning
need in no way be equivalent to specifying what the utterance means
in a strictly linguistic sense.)
Grice, of course, did not completely disregard the possibility
that some of the intentions which he postulated may not always be
recognized. However, he did not grant that someone can be taken
by a listener to mean something in such circumstances. Here is
what he had to say on the matter. (A here is the speaker.)
"Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to
mean something by x as follows: A must intend to
induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must
also intend his utterance to be recognized as so
intended. But these intentions are not independent;
the recognition is intended by A to play its part
in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so
something will have gone wrong with the fulfilment
of A's intentions. Moreover, A's intending that
the recognition should play this part implies, I
think, that he assumes that there is some chance that
it will in fact play this part, that he does not
regard it as a .foregone conclusion that the belief will
be induced in the audience whether or not the
intention behind the utterance is recognized."
(my underlining) Grice, 1357, p.383~38U
Whatever criticisms are levelled against Grice's account, one
cannot dismiss his principal claim: the meaning which the
individual gives to an utterance in a communication situation
is greatly influenced by factors other than its language.
Proposals such as the two which have been discussed have had
a widespread and profound effect on the thinking in several areas
of psychology and linguistics.
We already mentioned the work being done on pre-linguistic
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communication. This has "been considerably influenced by the ideas
of the 'Speech Act' philosophers.
The theory of grammar has been similarly affected. Chomsky
(1957, 1965) had proposed that the structural basis of grammar was
strictly syntactic. However, following the above proposals
concerning the functions of language, other investigators began to
consider that grammar may have a more appropriate basis. It was
argued that the basis of grammar should, instead, be semantic; that
is, based on the meaning of words. (See Schlesinger, 1971a,, 1971b;
Fillmore, 1968; McCawley, 1968.) Furthermore, many of the factors
now judged to be important for grammatical decisions are actually
factors external to the particular utterances used as examples.
(For some interesting arguments, see Ziff, 1965; Olson, 1970;
Lakoff, 1971; and Osgood, 1971.)
1.l; Literal and Non-Literal Interpretations of Communicative Intent
There are at least two ways in which the listener may go about
deriving a speaker's meaning for an utterance. He may construct the
meaning primarily on the basis of what the words of the utterance
denote (that is, linguistic sentence meaning), and only secondarily
on the basis of the context of utterance. Alternatively, the listener
may construct a speaker's meaning primarily on the basis of the
context of utterance. The former meaning is what is commonly
referred to as literal interpretation while the latter is referred to
as non-literal interpretation.
In those circumstances where there is a significant correspondence
between the linguistic sentence meaning of an utterance and its
perceived context, there cannot be any significant difference between
the literal and non-literal interpretations of what the speaker means
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by the utterance. Furthermore, the non-literal interpretation, like
the literal interpretation, will be consistent with the linguistic
sentence meaning of the utterance. Let us consider as example, the
sentence
'Eat up the rest of the biscuits'
spoken in a situation where the speaker actually proffers the plate
of biscuits from which he and the listener had been eating. It will
not matter greatly whether the speaker's meaning is constructed
primarily on the basis of what the entire context suggests or on the
basis of the linguistic sentence meaning.
In the circumstances where there is little correspondence between
the linguistic sentence meaning of an utterance and its context,
however, one will find a large discrepancy between the literal and
non-literal interpretations of a speaker's meaning. In order to
construct a non-literal interpretation in such instances the
listener assumes a correspondence between sentence and context, and
the interpretation lacks consistency with the linguistic sentence
meaning. To construct a literal interpretation, on the other hand,
the listener imagines a context which corresponds with what the
sentence means.
To illustrate the point which we are trying to make, let us
consider the sentence
'Gould you hand me the rest of the dogs?'
spoken by a mother to her onlooking child while she (the mother) is
engaged in the task of gathering and counting forks in the kitchen.
(Let us assume the family possesses a number of dogs). The
immediate context quite clearly suggests that what the mother wants
are forks (this will be expecially the case where there had been no
mention of dogs either by the mother or the child in their preceding
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conversation). Giving a non-literal interpretation to the mother's
request, therefore, the child will he prompted to hand her some forks.
Where a literal interpretation is given, on the other hand, dogs,
rather than forks, will be sought and handed over.
The main point which we wish to make in drawing the distinction
between literal and non-literal messages is that what we tend to give
when we hear utterances is what has been described as non-literal
interpretation; that is, on top of the fact that we strive to deduce
the message which a speaker intends to convey by a sentence spoken in
a particular context, we commonly give considerable weight to what the
context of utterance suggests about a speaker's message; at least,
so long as this makes good sense or conforms with real life experience.
An extreme example is found in the case of metaphors and jokes.
Here the presuppositions expressed are literally impossible.
'She is a real gem'
'She is a cow'
In most other cases where we give non-literal interpretations to
utterances it is not that the presuppositions expressed are literally
impossible. In other cases literal interpretations are not considered
(or are not available) because the presupposition is unlikely.
Consider the sentence
'David is mad'
spoken in a situation where David has been having a serious argument
with Paul who is absolutely drunk. (The utterance is not from Paul).
Mental illness is not common enough for a listener to give a literal
meaning to this statement. The utterance will instead be taken to
mean that David is being unreasonable or impossible.
It can be argued for many utterances in ordinary conversations
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that the listener is almost invited to give considerable weight to
contest. Relevant pieces of information are left out of the
utterances themselves (Lyons, 1972). This practice is most out¬
standing in face-to-face interactions where the objects and events
being talked about are physically present.
Formal test situations in general and Piaget's concrete-operations
tests in particular, resemble everyday communication situations in
certain important respects. However, this notwithstanding, some of
the demands made in tests are quite unlike those that arise in everyday
speech life. The one which is of interest here is the implicit
requirement that subjects interpret the questions put to them as
literally as possible, and even when the non-literal alternatives are
no less likely.
However, it is one thing for tests to make such a demand, and
quite another for all subjects to meet it. Young children in
particular may fail to meet the test demand. They may give, instead,
interpretations which are constructed primarily on the basis of
context.
It follows that in circumstances where there is little correspond¬
ence between the literal and the non-literal interpretation of a test
question, young children may fail merely because of a preference for
making an interpretation mainly based on contexts.
A similar explanation has been suggested to explain failure of
children's performance in both the Conservation and Class Inclusion
Tests of Piaget.^ In the original account given by McGarrigle and
his colleagues, no distinction was made between literal and non-literal
interpretations of utterances. Only one kind of speaker's meaning was
considered, and this was contrasted with linguistic sentence meaning.
The latter was represented as the desired interpretation of test
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questions and as what older subjects prefer to give. Presented
below are some of Donaldson's (1978) supporting remarks about this
account -
"Leaving explanation aside, what actually happens
when a 'non-conserving' response occurs? It
amounts to this: in a short space of time, the
child gives two conflicting answers to what, for
an adult, is the same question with 'the same
meaning'. But suppose that the child is not
concerned to weigh specially what the words of the
question mean in isolation. Suppose he is rather
interpreting the whole situation: what the
experimenter says, what he does, what he may
reasonably be thought to intend."
Donaldson, 1978, pp. 62-63 (my underlining)
"One way to describe the difference between child
and adult would then be to say that it lies in
the amount of weight that is given to sheer
linguistic form. The question seems to be
whether the meaning of the language carries
enough weight to over-ride the meaning of the
situation. Does the language have priority?
Can it over-ride reasonable expectation?
Donaldson, 1978, p. 63 (my underlining)
It can be argued that even though the older subject may not
interpret Piagetian test questions in the same manner as the young
child, he must, like the child, be aware of the meaning of the
immediate physical situations. To this extent, the older subject
does not interpret the words of the questions in isolation as implied
by Donaldson.
A stronger and more important objection to Donaldson's account
concerns the fact that there are a number of words which cannot be
given a meaning in isolation and can only be interpreted within a
particular context. The words in question include I, you, he, she,
we, they, them, this, that, here, there (commonly referred to as
'deictics'), and the definite article 'the'.
Let us consider as example the following utterance
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'She will be arriving soon'
A listener will not be able to identify the referent of the term
'she' unless something had been said or done in the immediately
preceding context about a particular female. The speaker might
have shown a photograph of his mother or girlfriend, for example,
or he might have said something about such individuals in which
they were more or less named.
This same condition holds for the identification of the referent
in the following utterance.
"The lady will be arriving soon'
Some of the expressions used in the concrete-operations tests
may be placed in the same category with the ones mentioned above.
The quantitative term 'more' used in both the Conservation and Class
Inclusion questions is a very good example. Consider the utterance
'I shall add some more'
A listener will only be able to identify what the speaker means
to add by searching the context of utterance. Furthermore, the
same term is used to speak of various kinds of quantity (length,
volume, number, density, height, diameter, temperature, pressure,
to name a few). Consider the utterance
'One has more than the other'
spoken where amounts of mercury placed in identical beakers are being
compared in a chemistry laboratory. Mercury is one of those liquids
which expand on being heated. The quantities under comparison may
differ, not only in the heights reached in the beakers, but also in
the temperatures to which they are heated. However, unless the
quantities are of the same volume, the higher-reaching amount may
not be the one with the higher temperature. It will be left to
the context of utterance to determine what kind of quantity the
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speaker has in mind-
However, it is necessary for the cases which we have been
describing to distinguish between the linguistic context on the one
hand, and the extralinguistic and paralinguistic context on the other.
This is because linguists make a distinction (particularly when
discussing the definite article) between identifying a referent from
one or the other context. Identification made by reference to the
previous linguistic context is described as anaphoric, while
identification made from the paralinguistic or extralinguistic
context is described as exophoric.
Situations of course differ with respect to where a listener
may locate the intended referent of these special terms. In some
cases, the necessary information will be contained in both the
speaker's previous utterances and in the paralinguistic/extralinguistic
context. Provided that the information from the two sources are
identical, the listener will not experience any difficulties in such
circumstances. However, it is possible to have a situation where
different potential referents are indicated. In such circumstances,
a listener must choose one of the two possibilities.
Let us consider again the utterance
'She will be arriving soon'
made where the speaker has just said something about his mother and
has also presented a photograph of his girlfriend. There is little
to help a listener decide which of the two females the speaker means.
He is just as likely to be referring to the mother as to the girl¬
friend and he cannot be referring to them both. One may describe
the circumstances as one where the potential referents are incompatible.
The speaker's mother and his girlfriend cannot be one and the same
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person.
In seme other circumstances, the referents indicated by the
linguistic and paralinguistic/extralinguistic context may be
different but they may be compatible; thus allowing a listener to
consider both as being intended instead of choosing between them.
Let us use here the example of the utterance
•One has more than the other'
made where the speaker has just said something about the heights
reached by amounts of mercury and has also taken their temperatures.
In the circumstances described above, one may consider a list¬
ener who chooses a speech-indicated referent as giving a more
literal interpretation. On the other hand, a listener who chooses
the referent indicated in the paralinguistic/extralinguistic
context alone (or this together with the speech-indicated referent
where possible) may be considered as giving a more non-literal
interpretation.
Piaget's Conservation and Class Inclusion tests may be seen as
presenting subjects with this particular kind of choice. (See
section 2.5).
It is worth noting here the claim that children master exophoric
reference before they do anaphoric reference. Specifically,
anaphoric reference is said to be beyond the child until he is about
8 years. (Warden, 1978; Karmiloff-Smith, 1979). This claim may
be taken by us as a suggestion that young children will not give
literal interpretation to utterances even where such interpretation
is reasonable. At the very least, the claim may be taken to mean
that where there exists a choice of potential referents, young
children will give that which is indicated by the paralinguistic/
extralinguistic context. Hoever, some writers have claimed that
young children are quite capable of managing anaphoric reference
(Maratsos, 1976). The lack of agreement between results may arise
from the differences between the situations in which comprehension
is assessed.
We shall be using the term 'Situational' interpretation to refer
to what has been described here as non-literal interpretation. The
purpose of the alternative term is simply to draw attention to the
heavy reliance on extralinguistic and paralinguistic contexts for
such interpretation. Literal interpretations, we must repeat, are
similarly derived partly from such contexts, only to a reduced extent.
So far, no suggestion has been made as to why young children
should give only situational interpretations. It is clear from the
definition given at the beginning of this section that the construction
of literal interpreations must place a greater cognitive demand on the
individual than the construction of situational interpretations.
However, it is also clear that the level of demand made by literal
interpretations will vary for different situations and for different
sentence meanings. At one end of the continuum we have those circum¬
stances where there is little correspondence between the linguistic
sentence meaning of an utterance and what we know to obtain in real
life; that is, the presupposition expressed describes an impossible
state-of-affairs (cases of jokes or metaphor). Closely following in
order of decreasing complexity are circumstances where the presuppos¬
ition expressed by a sentence describes a possible state-of-affairs,
but there is little correspondence between linguistic sentence meaning
and the immediate context ('Could you hand me the rest of the dogs').
At the other end of the continuum we have those circumstances
where there is almost perfect correspondence between sentence meaning
and immediate context ('Eat up the rest of the biscuits'). Obviously
the cognitive demand in this last case is only minimal. The listener
does not have to undertake the task of visualizing a context which
corresponds with the meaning of the sentence given. Those circum¬
stances where the listener has to identify the intended referent of an
expression from its context cannot be placed at the more complex end
of the continuum either. The context which the listener has to
analyse is real and immediate, or at least very recent. Even when a
listener fails to identify a referent in the linguistic context as
intended by the speaker, therefore, (or where the listener goes by what
the paralinguistic/extralinguistic context suggests), there will be
little necessity for us to appeal to any complex cognitive deficiency
for an explanation. Perhaps an explanation for this can be found by
considering circumstances of language acquisition.
Since the Piagetian tests which we are considering fall into
this last category of circumstances, we shall not be asking whether
young children might not be capable of literal interpretations as such
or whether they lack the necessary cognitive requirements. It will
be more reasonable to consider simply that the children attach more
weight to what situations suggest about the intended messages of
utterances than others do.
It has been claimed that children depend on their sensitivity to
social situations for the development of language and for responding
to language in a general sense. Such common dependence on situations
could make it difficult for a young child to reduce the weight given
to the situation of utterances when interpreting them. In the next
chapter, we shall examine these claims.
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CHAPTER 2
Sensitivity to Situations and its Contribution to the
Development and Use of Language by Young Children
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the claims that children depend
on their sensitivity to social situations for the development and use
of language. We shall consider first the claim about the development
of language. According to this claim, the child interprets utterance
situations (making use of non-linguistic clues which are paralinguistic
and/or extralinguistic in nature) to deduce the message which an
utterance is intended to communicate. The message arrived at in this
way is then used to work out the linguistic meaning of the utterance.
This process is commonly referred to as "matching®.
It is a well recognized fact that in most cases, adult-infant
interaction situations are conducive to such matching. The mother
(or other adult) tends to talk to the child about real and immediate
situations. This can sometimes take the form of great redundancy as
far as the mother's utterances are concerned. For example, when
obviously preparing the child's food, the mother will be more likely
to say things like, 'Food' or 'Milk' or 'I am preparing your food/milk'
or 'Your food will soon be ready'. (This redundant nature of the
mother's utterances vis a vis the actions she is performing has been
pointed out by Huttenlocher, 197l+j among others.) It is almost as
if the mother has an innate awareness of the child's techniques for
learning language and she wants to play her part in ensuring that the
learning tabes place.
Not only does the mother make utterances about on-going events,
she also uses simple and correct grammar in talking to the child
(Brown and Bellugi, 196I4.; Phillips, 1973)• Such simplicity and
correctness will no doubt make it even easier to match linguistic
expressions onto non-linguistically derived concepts.
It is not the case that investigators who favour the above
claim consider that the ability to interpret situations appears
de novo in the very young child. It is believed that the ability
partly depends on the long-term development of ideas about the
environment and most investigators combine a study of the matching
with a study of the development of the non-linguistic concepts or
ideas. We shall now consider some of the relevant proposals.
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2.2 Proposals about the Role of Non-Linguistic Concepts in
Language Development
Proposals about the role of the non-linguistic concepts in
language development are not new. Commenting on some earlier
claims that the very young child uses the same word to refer to
several different things, and that single words are used as if
they were complete sentences, Grace De Laguna wrote in 1927J
"A child's word does not, as we have seen, designate
an object or a property or an act; rather it
signifies loosely and vaguely the object together
with its interesting properties and the acts with
which it is commonly associated in the life of the
child. The emphasis may be now on one, now on
another, of these aspects, according to the
exigencies of the occasion on which it is used.
Just because the terms of the child's language
are in themselves indefinite, it is left to the
particular setting and context to determine the
specific meaning for each occasion. In order to
understand what the baby is saying you must see
what the baby is doing. The simple sentence-word
is a complete proclamation or command or question,
because the speech in which it occurs is so closely
bound up with the attitude of response to his
immediate surroundings. The independence of the
primitive word with respect to other words is paid
for by its dependence on the practical situation."
De Laguna, , p.90-91.
Other investigators who held views similar to De Laguna were
Guillaume (1973- First published in French in 1927)» and
Leopold (19^+9 ) •
Bloom (1970, 1973) was among the first investigators to return
to this way of considering' early language in recent years. Her
first study was concerned with development at the stage when the*
child begins to put at least two words together. The second study
turned attention to development before this stage. What Bloom did
was to record the utterances of a few children together with the
descriptions of the situations accompanying the utterances. This
was done at regular intervals over a period of time allowing for
developments in both the child's non-linguistic concepts and his
linguistic expressions to be observed.
On analysing her data, Bloom found ample evidence that her
children engaged in very active and relatively advanced interpretive
structuring of the interactive situations in which they found them¬
selves. Furthermore, the grammatical functions which the children
came to express in their speech were those which they had already
developed non-linguistically. Among the concepts for which this
development was observed are possession and negation.
Bloom was moved to write:
"
- children perceive and organize their
experience of the world in the first two years
in terms of certain conceptual representations
that are not linguistic. Sometime during the
second year, the child begins to discover
aspects of the linguistic code that, in the
language of his environment can represent
certain conceptions of experience. It is
proposed that before the use of syntax in their
speech, children have little if any knowledge
of linguistic structure, and that children
learn syntax as a mapping or coding of their
underlying cognitive representations."
Bloom, 1973» P* 20.
One of the boldest statements of the proposal that the child
interprets situations to decipher language came from Macnamara (1972).
According to Macnamara, what several words, syntactic structures and
sounds denote can be discovered through this technique. Later,
Macnamara (1977) tried to conduct an experimental investigation of the
child's judgement of communicative situations. To give an example of
the tasks which were administered: the experimenter took a shoe in
one hand, and a spoon in the other. While holding out the shoe to
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the child who sits by the mother, the experimenter said, "Show me the
spoon, Harry." On other occasions the requests made were congruent
with the gestures made ("Show me the shoe, Harry"; when holding out
the shoe, or "Show me the spoon, Harry"; when holding out the spoon).
Other variations included omission of the child's name from the
verbal requests, and, also, directing gaze at the mother while
addressing the child.
The children in the study were aged between 12 and 17 months.
Macnamara found that the clues which are interpreted include objects
which are present, the movement of objects, human gestures and eye-to-
eye contact. These are very much the same as older children and
adults employ in everyday situations, and they presuppose considerable
consciousness of human feelings, purposes and cooperative relations.
(Greenfield and Smith (1976) have also made a very important study
of the non-linguistic clues which the child at the one-word stage
employs to interpret communicative situations. Some of the types of
clues examined were intonation, gesture, action, and visual attention.)
Most other investigators lay emphasis on the prior development of
the non-linguistic concepts which enable the child to make sense of
particular communicative situations. Slobin (1973) and Nelson (1973)>
for example, asserted that many linguistic forms cannot appear in the
child's speech until he has developed the appropriate non-linguistic
concepts. As Nelson put it -
"The child then must have an existing schema or concept
in order to learn a word that applies to it. If the
words that the parents use do not apply to the domain
of the schemata that the child has constructed, those
words will not be learned."
Nelson, 1973» P« 98.
More recently, Nelson wrote that -
i+6.
"To understand, the acquisition of linguistic terms and
their meanings we must understand the conceptual
development process and how it interacts with language
learning."
Nelson, 19T7» P» 13U»
(See, also, Nelson, 197U)-
At the same time as he emphasized the prior existence of
appropriate non-linguistic concepts, Slohin also emphasized the role
of formal linguistic complexity in the development of language. He
noted that some linguistic forms do not appear in the child's speech
even though he is already capable of the ideas which they represent.
It is not only for the purposes of deciphering language that the
child interprets communicative situations. He does so also for the
purpose of successful responding to linguistic expressions of which
he has only partial knowledge. In this instance, what the child
tries to derive from the situation is a technique to supplement his
limited linguistic knowledge. Such technique is commonly referred
to as rule or strategy.
In the studies which investigate these non-linguistic strategies,
the investigator begins by picking a linguistic expression of which
the children of a particular age group are known to lack adequate
understanding. A situation is then contrived for presenting the
expression. This situation will be such that it will be possible
to find out whether the children indulge in the use of non-linguistic
strategies when responding to the particular expression. The
investigator then tries to work out the kind of strategies from the
responses given. Usually, the studies involve children of a
relatively wide age range. This permits the identification of any
changes which might take place in the non-linguistic strategies
employed as development proceeds.
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2.3 Proposals about the Role of Non-Linguistic Strategies in
Language Use
One of the earliest proposals about children's use of non-linguist¬
ic strategies came from Clark (1973). Clark's study was concerned with
the comprehension of the locative prepositions, 'in', 'on', and 'under'.
The children were aged 1 year and 6 months to 3 years. They were
required to put small toy animals in, on, and under some reference
points which were a box, a tunnel, a truck, a crib, a bridge and a
table. Each of these reference points allow two of the spatial
relations in question; thereby making possible an incorrect response
as well as a correct one. The tunnel, for example, allows for an
object to be placed in or on it; the truck allows for in or under;
and the table allows for on or under.
The instructions given were of the form, 'Put x in (on, under)
the y !. There were eight instructions each for the three
prepositions, each preposition occurring twice with each of the
four reference points that allowed the relation (in, for example,
occurred twice each with the "box, the tunnel, the truck and the
crib.)
Clark obtained results which would ordinarily suggest that her
children had a good understanding of in, an intermediate understand¬
ing of on, and a very poor understanding of under. This was
particularly true for the youngest children tested. The pattern
of the results, however, led Clark to postulate the use of
non-Unguistic strategies by the children. She noted that when
the reference point was a container (box, tunnel, truck or crib),
the youngest subjects treated all the instructions as if they
involved 'in'. When the reference point was not a container, but
had a supporting surface (bridge and table), the children treated
all the instructions as if they involved 'on'. Consequently,
Clark postulated the existence of the following strategies:-
1. If the reference point is a container, x is inside it.
2. If the reference point has a horizontal surface, x is
on it.
According to Clark, these non-linguistic strategies or rules
interact with the child's relatively undeveloped linguistic
semantic knowledge about the meaning of the locative prepositions.
The behaviour of Clark's children also gave her the impression that
the non-linguistic rules are strictly ordered in the sense that the
first rule is always applied. The second one is applied only
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if the first fails. The application of these rules, and in the
particular order, helped to give an impression that the children
knew the meaning of 'in* and lacked that of 'under'.
Clark also suggested the use of non-linguistic strategies to
explain the results which had been obtained by others for children's
understanding of relational terms like 'more', 'less', 'same', and
'different'. (Donaldson and Balfour, 1968; Donaldson and Wales,
1970; Palermo, 1973). In these studies, children had been shown
to interpret 'less' as if it meant 'more', and 'different' was
interpreted as if it meant the 'same'. The results had been interpreted
at the time by many investigators, including Clark, only in terms of the
7child's linguistic hypotheses about the meanings of the expressions,,
However, with regard to 'more' and 'less', for example, Clark
(1973) suggested that instead of assuming as before that the two
terms are synonymous for the child, with 'less' carrying the meaning
of an understood 'more', one could suppose that both word meanings
are actually incomplete, and that the child's responses are based on
the partial meaning which he has for both 'more' and 'less',
together with his application of certain non-linguistic strategies
for understanding what his interlocutor wishes him to do. (See,
also, Clark, 1975). The particular strategy which she suggested
is one of usually choosing the greater of two or more amounts or
choosing the more extended object on a dimension such as length or
height. This strategy was supposed to be used together with a
partial semantic knowledge of the language terms. According to
Clark, the behaviour of the children in Donaldson and Wales' study
indicates that they knew at least that 'more' and 'less' refer to
amount.
As the accounts given indicate, for Clark, the non-linguistic
strategies employed by the young child derived essentially from
his -percepts. With regard to the understanding of locative
prepositions, for example, she gave that her younger subjects were
guided by their knowledge of the reference points. Clark later
modified her account to give that the strategies derive from the
child's concepts. However, this was not before she was criticized
by other investigators. (For the modified account, see Clark, 1975,
1977, for example.) Apart from questioning the basis of the
strategies postulated by Clark, the generality of the specific ones
inferred by her was also questioned. It was reasoned that the
strategies might have been inferred essentially because of the
nature of the objects used in the studies and/or because of the
limited range of response alternatives provided in them. The
results of new studies upheld these criticisms.
One study which tested the understanding of 'less' was
carried out by Wannemacher and Ryan (1978). The authors designed
various tasks which allowed for a wider range of response
alternatives to the language term. The children tested were
3 to 5 years old. In one of the tasks, two girl dolls (identical
except for the length of hair) were shown to the child. He was
then given the following instruction: "These two girls are twins.
There is only one way to know which doll is Susie and which doll
is Jane. Susie has less hair than Jane. Which doll is Susie?"
Unlike the results of Donaldson and Wales (1970), Wannemacher
and Ryan found little evidence to suggest that young
children confuse 'less' with 'more'. (See, also, Brewer and Stone,
1975; and Carey, 1978.) Furthermore, for most of the tasks, the
I4 and 5 year olds behaved as if they understood the meaning of
'less', while the 3 year olds behaved at chance level. The
particular strategy proposed by Clark for the understanding of the
term cannot be used to explain these results. What the results
suggested was that, contrary to Clark's initial theorizing, the
young child's non-linguistic strategies for the comprehension of
'less' and 'more' cannot be based on mere perceptions of isolated
objects or events in the situations in which the terms are used.
The child must be taking several factors into account at any one
time. (Similar results to Wannemacher and Ryan's were obtained
for 'same' and 'different' by Glucksberg, Hay and Danks, 1976).
Wilcox and Palermo (1975)> on their part, carried out a
further investigation of children's understanding of 'in', 'on'
and 'under'. Their study was similar to Clark's but different
pairs of materials were used - teapot/table; boat/bridge;
road/truck; block/neutral figure. The neutral figure was such
that it could take the block 'in', 'on' or 'under' it. The first
three pairs of materials were each used twice while the fourth was
used thrice. The tasks or instructions were characterized as
being either contextually congruent or contextually incongruent.
In the contextually congruent tasks the relationships described in
the instructions were the normal ones which existed between the
object-pairs in real life situations. In the contextually
incongruent tasks, on the other hand, this was not the case. An
example of the former is 'Can you put the teapot 011 the table'.
An example of the latter is 'Can you put the road in the truck'.
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It would, be expected that if Clark's strategies applied always,
younger children will put the road in the truck when requested to
do so; that is, they should ignore the normal road-under-truck
relationship between the two objects. The children tested were
aged 1 year and 6 months to 3 years.
As far as the contextually congruent tasks were concerned, the
children in Wilcox and Palermo's study performed in a way similar
to that of Clark's children. However, the picture was quite
different for the contextually incongruent tasks. Here the older
children in particular interpreted the instructions incorrectly,
placing the object-pairs in their more normal relationships. Instead
of putting the road in the truck, for example, many placed it under
the truck. (See, also, Strohner and Nelson's study (iJTh) of the
non-linguistic strategies employed by young children for the
comprehension of active and passive sentences.) As for the results
of Wannemacher and Ryan with the term 'less', the kind of behaviour
suggests that the young child does not work from perceptions of
isolated objects.
Hoogenraad, Grieve, Baldwin and Campbell (1978) also have
questioned the generality of Clark's non-linguistic strategies.
They put forward an alternative explanation which is not unlike
that of Wilcox and Palermo, placing considerable emphasis on the
role of past experience in determining children's conceptions of
the usual relations between objects. The authors point out that
experiences may differ between children, as well as between
children and adults. The conceptions of the relations between
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objects may, therefore, differ. This being the case, we as adults
may not always be able to make accurate predictions about the exact
nature of the non-linguistic strategies which young children will
employ for the learning of words. Indeed, some strategies have
been inferred which are quite unusual from the adult point of view.
Donaldson and McGarrigle (197U) tested children's (3 and I; year
olds) understanding of utterances containing the quantifiers 'all',
and 'more' in a situation of toy cars and garages. There were two
unequal rows of cars arranged on two shelves, one directly above the
other. Half of the time, joined sets of detachable and doorless
garages were placed over the cars. For the longer row of cars (5)>
unlike for the shorter row (i+), there was an extra unoccupied garage.
The sentences given, and which the children had to make true/false
judgements about, were - 'Are there more cars on this shelf or more
cars on this shelf?', and 'Are all the cars on this shelf?'. The
experimenter indicated the relevant shelf in each case. Each child
received the two questions, both with and without the garage sets.
One half got the garages present condition first and the other half
got the garages absent condition first.
The interesting finding for the 'more' sentence was that fourteen
out of the forty children tested changed their judgements about
which shelf had more cars when the garages were introduced or
removed. Thirteen of the fourteen correctly chose the longer row
as having more cars when the garages were absent, but chose the
shorter row as having more when the garages were present. . The
reasons given by the children suggested that they had based their
judgements on the fullness of the garage sets.
There were two main interesting findings for the 'all' sentence.
First, nearly half of the children judged the sentence to he
correct for each of the two rows all the time; that is, both in
the presence and absence of the garage sets. This is not the
interpretation of the situation one would expect from adults and
older children. From an adult point of view, 'all' the cars
cannot be said to be on one shelf when there were cars on the
second shelf.
Donaldson and McGarrigle report that the children (except for
two) could not give any justifications for their judgements. The
reasons given by the two exceptions were not in the least
instructive. One can only assume that young children's conceptions
of the relationship between objects like cars and shelves are
different from those of adults and older children. As Donaldson
and McGarrigle themselves considered, it would have been possible
(as a result of the differing conceptions) for the children to
assume at the beginning of the task (when being introduced to the
cars and shelves) that the cars on each shelf belonged to it, and
in a way that excluded the cars on the other shelf. If such an
assumption was made, then 'Are all the cars on this shelf?' will
be taken to mean something like, 'Are all the cars meant for (or
belonging to) this shelf on it?'
The second interesting finding for the 'all' sentence was that
fourteen children judged it to be incorrect for the longer row but
correct for the shorter one when the garages were present. As
for the reasons given for the judgements of the 'more' sentence,
the explanations of the children suggested that they had based
their judgements on the fullness of the garage sets. This indeed
is surprising, and, again, suggests that even where objects like
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cars and garages are concerned, young children's conceptions may
differ from those of adults and older children. From an adult
point of view, the presence of the garages and their fullness are
irrelevant factors and should not affect the judgements of the
sentences.
The above kind of finding is not an isolated one. Similar
results were obtained for another study carried out by Donaldson
and Lloyd (197U)- In a similar fashion to Clark, Donaldson and
her colleagues postulated that the non-Unguistic strategies
employed by the young child must be hierarchially ordered.
Furthermore, the non-linguistic concept of fullness is relatively
high up in the hierarchy; higher than length, say.
Most of the authors whom we have been discussing suggest that
the non-linguistic strategies which the child employs in the very
early years for responding to partially understood expressions are
abandoned as progress is made, both in the development of specific
linguistic strategies and in the nature and richness of the child's
non-linguistic concepts themselves. But this cannot be taken to
mean that the child abandons non-linguistic strategies entirely.
Language development takes many years. The dependence on non-
linguistic strategies, therefore, probably remains with the child
for some time. (For details of studies which reveal the late
development of important language aspects, see the review by
Palermo and Molfese, 1972.)
The conclusion that the initial dependence on non-linguistic
strategies persists for some time in development was drawn, also,
by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975). There is some empirical
support for the conclusion. Harris (1975)? for example, investigated
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1+ to 12 year old children's understanding of some complex sentences.
These are sentences which contain main verbs which take underlying
sentences as their complements; as in 'Sally knew that she was early'.
Harris found evidence that even the oldest children had not yet
attained adult-level comprehension of the construction. Furthermore,
on some of the tasks, the children tended to make pragmatic inferences
and showed in comparison to adults, excessive dependence on knowledge
about the world.
2.i+ Implications of the Dependence of Language Development and
Language Use on Situational Suggestions
The important implication of the dependence of language development
and language use on situational suggestions is that young children may,
in general, have greater faith in situational clues than do older
children and adults. If this should be the case, it will be reasonable
to expect the children to find it difficult to reduce the weight given
to such clues when interpreting utterances. This kind of difficulty
may account for young children giving only the situational or non-
literal interpretations of communicative intent. At the same time,
the difficulty may account for the children's failure on tests where
the non-literal interpretations that can be given to the questions
asked differ from the literal alternatives. We shall presently give
the details of this explanation as it applies to Piaget's Conservation
and Class Inclusion tests. But, first, we wish to turn attention to
a problem associated with the evidence for children's use of non-
linguistic strategies for the comprehension of partially grasped
expressions. The problem has a bearing on the new explanation for
Piaget's tests.
The problem is that young children may employ non-linguistic
strategies in test situations even when they possess adequate under¬
standing of the linguistic expressions given. If the children have
more faith in situational suggestions than others do then, it will be
reasonable to expect them to act on the basis of such suggestions
(especially where they make good sense) perhaps even where they are
inconsistent with known linguistic meaning. Furthermore, children
may not always recognize in the comprehension tests that what they
are supposed to give is what the linguistic expressions stand for;
and not just what the experimenter appears to be communicating with
the expressions in the particular contexts. We appreciate the fact
that the investigator may not get any further in resolving this
problem by decontextualizing the expressions and asking directly what
the key terms represent. Such an approach may be impracticable with
young children. Older children and adults, on their part, will have
little difficulty in grasping the nature of strict comprehension
tests.
It follows from the above that we need not take evidence for
the use of non-linguistic strategies as evidence for the inadequate
knowledge of a linguistic expression. It may be quite possible by
suitable selection of tests, to induce the 4 or 5 year old, for
example, to employ these strategies for responding to some terms
previously regarded as grasped by him. Admittedly/ there is a danger
of falsely concluding that children understand terms which they do
not understand, but there is also a real danger of falsely concluding
the opposite. Of particular interest to us here is the evidence
cited in the last section for the term "more"; an expression used in
both the Conservation and Class Inclusion tests.
The issue raised above has been considered also by Grieve,
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Hoogenraad and Murray (1977)- The work reported was concerned with
children's understanding of the prepositions 'in', 'on', and 'under'.
The authors suggest that in some cases, and at some point in develop¬
ment, the problem faced by the young child may not be that he does
not understand the lexical content of some words. His problem,
according to them, may reside in a relatively low confidence in his
understanding of language. To quote the authors -
"But the young child, of 1-J- or 2 years say, has reason to
be generally less confident of his understanding of
language than he is of his appreciation and construal
of the extralinguistic world. This may lead him to
neglect his understanding of an utterance (to the extent
that he does understand it of course) when it seems to
him to conflict with what he believes, on the basis of
his construal of the context to be an appropriate
interpretation of what is required."
Grieve et al, 1977» P« 236.
"One consequence of this is that a correct response to
an instruction involving in, on or under cannot be
taken as proof of understanding of the preposition,
since the response may be based on non-linguistic
factors, as Clark (1973) Has pointed out. But also
note that an incorrect response cannot be taken as
proof of a lack of understanding, since it may result
from a conflict between the child's understanding of
the preposition and what he believes to be an
appropriate response in that situation."
Grieve et al, 1977» P« 237•
2.5 Reappraisal of Piaget's Tests
Conservation:
We may compare the Conservation test with one of the situations
described in section 1.1+. This is the one where the utterance
•One has more than the other'
is made with relation to two amounts of mercury which differ in height
in one direction and temperature in the other direction; thus
suggesting at least two different interpretations for the utterance.
In the same way, the experimenter in the conservation test asks a
"more" question after speaking about the intrinsic quantity
attribute of some material and after transforming other attributes
of the material. The subject may consider either the intrinsic
attribute (speech-indicated) or the changeable properties
(paralinguistically-indicated) as the intended criteria for judging
the conservation question; or both the intrinsic value and the
changeable values may be considered as being intended since these
are not necessarily incompatible. The choice of criterion will
depend on the magnitude of the weight given to the suggestion from
the experimenter's transformation action. Where a subject gives
considerable weight to the suggestion, and, as a result, takes the
intended criteria to be the transformed properties, he will automat¬
ically give non-conserving responses.
Glass Inclusion:
The subject in the Class Inclusion test is presented with a
number of items which form two subclasses of one main class. The
experimenter asks for a comparison of the size of the main class
with that of the larger subclass. However, the fact that there are
two subclasses provides a very strong indication that the subclasses
are to be compared. This situational suggestion receives additional
strength from the fact that ordinarily, it is more common to compare
subclasses with respect to relative quantity. In other words, the
presupposition expressed by the inclusion question describes an
unusual, even though possible, state-of-affairs. We may compare
the situation with the one given in section 1.1+ where someone says
'David is mad'
after seeing David argue in earnest with his drunken pal, Paul. It
is not impossible for David to be mentally ill, but true mental
illness or one which might call for psychiatric attention is not
common enough for us to give a literal interpretation to the kind
of statement most of the time. Furthermore, entering into an
argument with someone who is not in a state fit for reasoning
cannot serve as sufficient evidence for true madness. In the
same way, a subject in the Inclusion test may give a non-ligeral
interpretation to the inclusion question. He may attach consider¬
able weight to the suggestion from both the immediate context and
the real life context of class comparisons and, as a result,
compare subclasses to arrive at a non-inclusion response.
The above accounts of how a subject might be led to fail on
the Conservation and Class Inclusion tests sound vexy plausible
indeed.■ However, as we shall see in the next chapter, the
studies which purport to demonstrate the validity of similar accounts
are not without some shortcomings which cannot be discounted by way
of verbal arguments alone. In chapter I4, we report some experiments
which were carried out with new tests to investigate the accounts
further.
CHAPTER 3
Review of Relevant Experimental Studies
In this chapter, we shall review the studies which have been
carried out to investigate the new account for failure on the
Conservation and Class Inclusion tests, beginning with McGarrigle and
Donaldson's (1975) study of the Conservation test.
The hypothesis investigated by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975)
is that young children fail on the Conservation test because they
consider the experimenter's transformation action as relevant for the
interpretation of the conservation question. According to the
authors, the transformation action as performed by the experimenter,
is irrelevant to the logical requirements of the test and to the
interpretation of the question. The action, however, leads young
children to infer an intention on the part of the experimenter to talk
about what he has just been doing; that is, an intention to talk
about the transformed properties.
In order to test the above hypothesis, McGarrigle and Donaldson
(M & D) gave a version of the Conservation test 'in which the
transformation of materials was presented as a by-product of an
undesired activity. The undesired activity was made to be carried
out by a small teddy bear introduced at the beginning of testing as
being very naughty, and liable to escape from its box from time to
time and mess up the game. Alter eliciting a correct judgement to
the initial question in the task, the experimenter picked up teddy
and moved it towards the aligned materials; expressing surprise and
alarm at teddy's behaviour and unkind goal as he did so. Teddy was
subsequently used to transform the materials. M & D hoped that by
using the teddy bear in this way, the transformation will appear to
the young subject as unintended for comment and, therefore, as
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irrelevant to the interpretation of the conservation question when
this was given.
The teddy task was named 'Accidental Transformation' condition
and the traditional task was described as the 'Intentional Transform¬
ation' condition. Two quantities were investigated; number and
length. The children tested were aged between 1+ years 2 months and
6 years 3 months. M & D compared the children's performance on
teddy number and length tasks with their performance on traditional
number and length tasks.
The results obtained by M & D largely supported their hypothesis.
Nearly three-quarters of the responses given in the accidental
transformation condition were conserving responses. In the intent¬
ional transformation condition, on the other hand, conserving responses
were given only a third of the time. Furthermore, while fifty of the
eighty subjects involved in the study conserved on both the number and
length teddy tasks, only thirteen subjects gave a similar performance
on the standard tasks.
The above findings have been replicated in three independent
studies. The first by J. Dockrell was cited in Donaldson (1978,
p. 6J4). The second was carried out by I. Neilson at the University
of Edinburgh, and the third by Light, Buckingham and Robbins (1979)•
In all cases, while the overall frequency of conserving responses was
lower than that obtained by M & D, the finding of a much higher rate
of such replies in the accidental condition was confirmed. In
addition to repeating M & D's study of the length task, Light et al
also investigated conservation of mass. For this, the authors
employed an approach which differed from the one employing the naughty
teddy. Instead of attributing the transformation of the pasta 'shells'
used to a teddy, it was made to seem incidental to a competitive game.
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As for the length task, Light et al got a significantly higher rate
of conserving responses in this version of the mass task than they
got in its standard form. Ve may conclude that there is considerable
experimental support for M & D's findings.
There are, however, a few problems with the study. To begin
with, the use of the term irrelevant1 to describe the transformation
action is perhaps unfortunate. The action is relevant in so far as
the experimenter wants to find out by it whether subjects understand
that quantities do not change in size merely as a result of changes
in appearance. Further, if M & D introduced the term to draw
attention to the fact that young children infer an intention on the
part of the experimenter to discuss transformed properties, the term
may have been uncalled for. Older subjects too may infer a similar
intention. The subjects may differ from the young ones simply in
attaching little weight to the inferred intention, thus reducing the
potential of the transformed properties as the criteria intended for
the judgement of the conservation question. We need not imagine then
that older subjects give conserving responses because they consider
the transformation action as irrelevant. The foregoing argument
against the introduction of the notion of irrelevance into the
Conservation test is similar to the argument presented in section 1.1;
against the idea that older subjects interpret the words of test
questions in isolation. In fact, the idea that the transformation
action is irrelevant might have been borne out of working with a
distinction between linguistic sentence meaning and speaker's meaning.
However, if we say that the transformation action is not
irrelevant to the interpretation of the conservation question then,
we may have to re-consider the facilitating effects of the teddy bean
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in M & D's study. Specifically, the apparently undesirable nature
of teddy's activities might not have caused the transformation action
to be considered as irrelevant. The activities, instead, might have
caused M & D's subjects to give less weight to the transformation which
takes place as older subjects would be moved to do in the traditional
task.
Another unfortunate aspect of M & D's work is the idea that the
experimenter's transformation action on its own may account for
children's non-conserving responses. The study carried out by Rose
and Blank (1971+) shows this idea to be false.
Rose and Blank (1971+) investigated a hypothesis that children
give non-conserving responses because they take the repetition of the
question after the transformation as a cue to alter the initial
judgement made to acknowledge the transformation. The authors noted
that in the normal (non-experimental) course of events, one would
never ask the same question twice if a significant change had not
occurred in the material that was being observed; the second asking
of the question being directed at the change.
Rose and Blank proceeded to give a form of the number conservation
task in which subjects saw the experimenter transform the task
materials but were asked to give a judgement only after the transform¬
ation; that is, only one judgement (and not two as in the standard
task) was requested. This was appropriately called the One-judgement
task, and performance on it was compared with performance on the
standard task.
There was also a control condition. In this condition, subjects
saw the materials only in their transformed state; that is, they did
not see the materials arranged first in one-to-one correspondence.
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This was called the Fixed-array task. According to Rose and Blank,
the condition was given to ascertain that any improved performance
in the one-judgement task was not due simply to the asking of a single
question, hut rather to the context in which the question was asked.
It was considered that where the materials are seen in their aligned
state before the conservation question is asked, the child is likely
to make use of this information in answering the question. On the
other hand, when the question is asked where the materials have never
been seen in alignment, the child is likely to be influenced more by
the qualitative or perceptual differences, and to rely on this in
formulating his answer.
The three different conditions were given to three different
groups of twenty eight children whose mean age was 6 years and 3
months.
As the authors anticipated, more conserving responses were given
on the one-judgement task than on the standard task or the fixed-array
.task. Specifically, errors were more than halved on the one-judgement
task relative to the other two tasks. This result is not to be
expected from M & D's account; for the experimenter performed the
transformation in the one-judgement task as happens in the standard
task. The result demonstrates quite clearly that the experimenter's
transformation action cannot by itself account for children's non-
conserving responses. Other factors in the test must be making
equally important contributions to the responses. In particular,
any effect of the action is partly due to the pre-transformation
interaction (verbal and non-verbal) between the subject and the
experimenter.
A final and vital criticism of M & D's study is that their
66.
results might not have amounted to evidence that young children are
capable of conserving length and number. It could be suggested,
for example, that the children gave conserving responses in the
accidental condition because they based their judgements on the
pre-transformation arrangements of the materials. This suggestion
could be made if it is considered that the children might have rejected
the reality of the transformation; this would be especially because it
was presented as undesired and its agent was inanimate. There is
some evidence that children could be influenced by the previous look of
task arrays. This evidence comes from the study by Donaldson and
McGarrigle (197U) mentioned in the last chapter. Some of the
children who received the garages-present condition first behaved
in the subsequent garages-absent condition as if the garages were
still there. (We might say that the absence of the garages was
rejected.) The trouble with this explanation for M & D's study is
that one could argue that it might require the same cognitive effort
to base the judgement of the conservation array on the pre-transformat¬
ion arrangement as to base the judgement of the array on the post-
transformation arrangement.
Alternatively, it could be suggested that M & D's children
merely held on to their pre-transformation judgements; that is, the
judgements themselves were repeated regardless of the pre- and post-
transformation arrangements of the materials. It could be suggested
for this explanation that the children could have regarded the teddy
bear's activities only as an undesirable interruption of the
experimenter's interrogations (Neilson, Dockrell and Campbell, 1979)•
This sounds a very reasonable explanation. However, if M & D's
children could have engaged in the above line of reasoning, what stops
them from thinking that the property which becomes transformed as a
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result of teddy's undesirable activities is not the intended referent
of the conservation question? And if the children engaged in this
reasoning, what stops it from being the explanation for their behaviour
in the teddy tasks? It could, however, be maintained in spite of the
explanation that M & D's children did not give conserving responses
because they were capable of conserving length and number. The
responses could be seen as mere artefacts of the 'teddy' situation.
In a way, the investigator who assumes the position that the
conserving responses in M & D's accidental condition were induced by
the situation is in no better position than his colleague who assumes
that non-conserving responses in traditional tasks are similarly
induced by situation. There can be no easy way of resolving the
issue. Moreover, one may have to extend the argument to other
studies which have claimed that young children are capable of
conservation. Of particular interest are those studies which did
not involve any changes being made to the format of the test
(Wallach, Wall and Anderson (19^7)» Gelman (19^9))• In these studies,
the investigators administered some special training programmes before
giving the standard task.
The hypothesis investigated by Gelman (1969) wan that young
children fail on standard conservation tests because they attend to
'irrelevant' features of the tests. This was meant in the sense that
the children have a natural preference for the features which happen
to be irrelevant for these tests. Gelman also noted that when the
experimenter introduces the transformation, children's attention is
likely to be drawn to 'irrelevant' cues. She suggested that the
manipulation would enhance the likelihood of a child using irrelevant
features to arrive at his judgement, since movement or change is
normally a way of bringing attention to an attribute.
Understandably, the apparent aim of the training programme
devised by Gelman was to get children to attend to quantity
(so-called relevant quantity cues) and to ignore non-quantitative
attributes (so-called irrelevant cues). The programme consisted
of length and number discrimination tasks and the problems given were
similar to conservation problems. The subject's task on each trial
was to point either to two of three stimulus objects that had the
same quantities or two that had differing quantities. The training
was given to two groups of 5 year old children; with one group
receiving feedback about their responses.
As one would expect, the discrimination training tasks which
incorporated feedback were highly successful in teaching Gelman's
children to attend to quantity. (it is worth noting here that at
the beginning of the training, the children in the two groups attended
to quantity 60% of the time.) More important, however, almost all
the children who received the training gave conserving responses on
subsequent trials of length and number conservation tasks. Also,
about half of the children gave conserving responses on subsequent
trials of mass and liquid amount tasks. In contrast, the children
who received the no-feedback training showed little improvement in
attention to quantity during training, and relatively few of them
gave conserving responses on subsequent conservation tasks. Gelman
was led to suggest that appropriate training for attention to
quantity (relevant cues in her words) must involve feedback of
information about the correctness of responses.
As for the results obtained by Rose and Blank (197U)> Gelman's
results could be employed to argue for the inaccuracy of M & D's
hypothesis. In fact, the results of any study based on a different
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kind of hypothesis from M & D's could be used in this way. (See,
for example, Frank (1966); Griffiths, Shantz and Sigel (19^7)»
Braine and Shanks (1965a; 1965b); Gruen (1965); Farnham-Diggory and
Bermon (1968); Peters (1970); Harasym, Boersma and Maguire (1971);
Gelman (1972), and Siegel (1978)). As did the finding by Rose and
Blank, these other findings suggest that the experimenter's transform¬
ation action in the standard Conservation test cannot by itself
account for children's non-conserving responses.
It is worth noting that, as for M & D's study, each of the
studies mentioned above is plagued by problems which make it difficult
to accept the exact interpretations offered for the results.
Considering Gelman (1969)» for example, her claim would suggest that
conservers and non-conservers would differ in the attributes which
are most salient for them. This prediction was not confirmed in a
test conducted by Miller (1973). As for those investigators who
attribute children's non-conserving responses essentially to a
failure to understand the key terms in the conservation question, we
are reminded of the discussion in section 2.1;.
We wish to turn next to the consideration of McGarrigle, Grieve
and Hughes' (1978) study of the Class Inclusion test.
The hypothesis investigated by McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes
(1978) is that young children fail on the traditional Inclusion test
because they assume that subclasses will be compared in the test.
The authors introduced certain minor changes to the test which were
aimed at emphasizing the whole-class, and thereby discouraging the
subclass comparison assumption. The changes were directed at both
the task array and the inclusion question. In all, six experiments
were carried out involving two different kinds of materials. We
shall consider here the fourth and fifth ones.
In these experiments, emphasis of the whole-class was partly
achieved by the introduction of new additional materials to the task
array. These •^ervs. a toy teddy, a toy table and a toy chair. The
actual inclusion materials, six plastic discs, were presented as
teddy's steps. The teddy and his properties were arranged as shown
with the child sitting near teddy's first step.
Chair Table
Teddy
The task was introduced to the child as one involving judgements
of the teddy's journeys to its chair (larger subclass) and its table
(whole class). In Experiment J4, the steps leading to teddy's chair
were red in colour and the steps leading from the chair to the table
were white in colour. In Experiment 5, on the other hand, there
was no intrinsic perceptual contrast between the subclasses of steps;
all were white.
Five questions were given; questions four and five being
repeats of questions one and two.
Are there more red (or 'white' in Experiment 5)
steps to go to the chair or more steps to go to
the table?
Are there more steps to go to the chair or
more steps to go to the table?
Is it further to go to the chair or further
to go to the table?
Repetition of first question.
Repetition of second question.
The questions were called A^; B^; C; A^; and Bg respectively.
The A questions, it would be noted, are most similar to the
traditional questions because they involve the subclass set being
qualified differently from the whole class set. The B questions
involve no such qualification. The children tested were aged
between 3 years 7 months and 3 years 3 months.
The results obtained helped to support McGarrigle et al's
hypothesis. More children than one finds with the traditional
inclusion test made inclusion judgements in the new situation.
Moreover, in spite of the difference between Experiments 1+ and 5,
in the subclasses of steps, the results for them were very similar.
The only difference in results was that in Experiment l;, performance
with the B questions (not involving the larger subclass being
qualified differently from the whole class) was better than perform¬
ance with the A questions. There was no such performance
difference between the A and B questions in Experiment 5. These
results seem to demonstrate that it is the way in which the task
array interacts with the language of the inclusion question which
explains young children's performance on the task. Specifically,
even when there exists a marked perceptual contrast between the
subclasses, when this is not mentioned in the question, children's
performance may be less influenced by the contrast.
The other result obtained by McGarrigle et al was that
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performance was best with question C which involved a different
word (further) from the one found in the standard inclusion task
(more). Furthermore, experience with this question led to
improved performance with consequent A and B questions.
The idea that young children fail on the standard Inclusion
test because they assume that subclasses will be compared is not new.
It was put forward by Wohlwill (1968), for example. However, Vohlwill
did not provide as clear a demonstration as McGarrigle et al did of
the relationship between the task array and the inclusion question.
Wohlwill hypothesized that children develop a "perceptual set" upon
seeing the two perceptually distinct subclasses which are unbalanced
as to number. This set, according to him, leads the children to
translate the inclusion question into a subclass comparison one.
Wohlwill went on to give the Inclusion test in a purely verbal
form; that is, he did not make use of pictures or physical classes
which were supposed to generate a 'set'. This new form of presenting
the test, however, made it necessary to give the inclusion question in
a more elaborate form than is found in the traditional test. To give
an example from a class of roses and violets; instead of asking the
child "Are there more flowers or more roses?" the experimenter asked,
"If I had six roses and two violets, would I have more flowers or
more roses?"
The children tested by Wohlwill (mean age 5 years and 11 months)
performed significantly better on the purely verbal tests than they
did on standard pictorial forms. The effects of practice with the
Inclusion test were also examined and it was found to be effective in
bringing about improved performance. (See also Ahr and Youniss (1970),
Winer and Kronberg (1977+) and Tatarsky (1977+)).
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A study carried out by Winer (197J+) made up for the limitations
of Wohlwill's verbal test study. Winer compared performance on a
standard Inclusion test with performance on a purely verbal test on
the one hand and performance on a pictorial test in which the question
was worded as in the purely verbal test on the other. No significant
difference was found between performance on the verbal test and the
verbally elaborate pictorial test. At the same time, performance on
both these tests was better than performance on the standard test.
Even though Winer did not interpret his results as such, they may be
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regarded as providing a clearer demonstration than Wohlwill's study
did of the interaction between task array and question in the Inclusion
test.
Some of the other investigators who have considered that children
are misled on the Inclusion test by a subclass-comparison assumption
have emphasized the role of past experiences in the arrival at the
assumption. Kalil, Toussef and Lerner (197i+) » for example, observed
that it is more likely that young children encounter situations which
require comparisons between mutually exclusive classes and subclasses
(like "boys" and "girls"), rather than comparisons between a super-
ordinate class and one of its subordinate classes (like "children" and
"boys"). Such experiences, according to Kalil et al, would lead to
the development of "learning sets" orienting the children toward making
the first kind of comparison. The authors suggested that without
attenuation of the inferred learning sets, the young child may miscon¬
strue the class-versus-subclass question, and believe a comparison
between the two subclasses was intended. It was proposed that all
that the child has to do to arrive at this false belief is to use the
name of the total class as a reference to the unmentioned subclass.
(See, also, Hayes, 1972).
However, it is still possible in spite of the evidence amassed by
the investigators cited above for someone to argue that children fail
on the Inclusion test for reasons other than the one suggested. As
several investigators have done for the conservation question, quite
a number of investigators have maintained that children do not under¬
stand the key terms in the traditional inclusion question. (See
Markman (1973)» Shipley (1979)» Markman and Seibert (1976) and Siegel,
McCabe, Brand and Matthews (1978)). In some cases, alternative terms
have been employed to test the children's understanding of inclusion.
McGarrigle et al's own result with the term "further" may be said to
bear out this contention. Moreover, the objection of possible
situational induction may be made against the results from all the
studies mentioned; that is, the modified tests might have merely
induced the children studied to give inclusion judgements without
necessarily proving that inclusion ability is within the children's
means.
Nevertheless, the more immediate question for us to try to answer
is one of whether young children could indeed be misled in Piagetian
concrete-operations tests in the manner prescribed by McGarrigle and
his colleagues. Specifically, do children give more weight to
situational suggestions than others do when they interpret questions
in tests? If we are to follow the trend of the arguments in this
chapter, it will become clear that what we require is a new test which,
like the Piagetian tests, makes possible a situational interpretation
that is at variance with the more literal interpretation of its
question, but which, unlike the Piagetian tests, provides limited
opportunity for disagreements as to the reason behind the responses
elicited.
Chapter U
Experiments vith the Tower-Building Test
General Introduction: The Tower-Building Test
The experiments reported here are mainly concerned with the
role of perception of the situation in young children's decisions
about the intended message of questions in Piagetian concrete-
operations tests. In particular, we investigated further the
contention that these children may fail on such tests because they
give to the critical test questions situational interpretations
which differ from the more literal alternatives.
We employed a new 'tower-building task' similar in design to
the conservation task. As in that task, and the class-inclusion
task, the situational interpretation of the critical question in
the tower-building task is at variance with its more literal
interpretation. In addition, the task is constructed so that
a subject could fail merely as a result of giving the situational
interpretation.^
The objective was to find whether or not young children will
give the situational interpretation and, therefore, give responses
which indicate failure ordinarily. The first four experiments
were particularly concerned with this objective.
Experiment U. 1
Introduction:
Subject and experimenter were seated at a table0 The task
began with the subject being told that he and the experimenter
would be building towers with blocks lying on the table. The
experimenter then went on to point out that too few of the blocks
were supplied and it would be necessary to obtain some more. Then
instead of providing the promised blocks, the experimenter embarked
on another activity - counting cylinders which were also present
on the table. One could also build the towers with the cylinders,
and actually, more of them than the blocks were provided. However
the superficial expectation was that the act of counting could make
some subjects forget what the experimenter had said about finding
more blocks. In other words, the counting act was a potential
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interfering event.
The cylinder counting was carried out in silence, and upon
its completion, the experimenter asked the subjects about the
blocks. The critical question was, 'Are there any more of them
in that box under your chair?'; the word 'them' being intended
according to what had been said first, as a reference to the blocks
alone. However, the box in question contained only cylinders.
The response given to the critical question, therefore, was
expected to indicate whether or not a subject remained attentive
to what was said at the start about the use of blocks to build
towers and the need for more of them.
Ve expected that a subject who attended to what had been said
in this way should say something like, 'No, there are none of them'
Any response contrary to this would ordinarily have suggested a
failure to think of the blocks; the most likely one being, "Yes,
there are some of them'. This kind of response depended of course
on the counting act having the particular effect of redirecting a
subject from the blocks to the cylinders in his thinking. Where
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it has a different effect, other responses may be expected.
(Pull details of the task will be given in the Procedures.)
An alternative view of the experimenter's counting:
The alternative view of the experimenter's counting is that
it could be seen by subjects as contributing information.about the
objective of the task; that is, it could be taken as a suggestion
that the cylinders as well will be used to build the towers.
There were two main reasons for expecting this effect, (a) the
cylinders were suitable, like the blocks, for building towers,
(b) the act of counting was quite consistent with the idea of
obtaining more of what to use for the towers. However, this
assumption will lead to a different understanding of the critical
question, giving the intended referent to be the cylinders together
with the blocks.
Given the way the task was presented, one would expect a subjec
who arrives at the above understanding to give one of the following
affirmative replies - 'Yes, there are some cylinders but no blocks'
or 'Yes, there are some of them'. We shall be referring to the two
kinds of responses together as Yes-responses.
The second Yes-response is less elaborate "than the first one.
More important, it can give the impression that the question had
been understood as a reference to the cylinders alone, and not to
the blocks at the same time. In fact, the response is identical
to the one which we said would ordinarily suggest a failure to
think of the blocks.
Thus we conclude that a subject could give a response which
indicates failure mainly because of the situational suggestion about
the cylinders, and not because he fails to think of the blocks.
It was hypothesized that most young subjects will give a lot
of weight to the suggestion about the cylinders and give the
Yes-responses as a result. Moreover, it was considered that many
of the subjects will give the Yes-response which could otherwise
indicate failure. Such results will provide tentative support
for the claim that young children may fail on Piagetian concrete-
operations tests because they give to the questions situational
interpretations which are different from the literal alternatives
intended by the experimenter.
We also gave the task in a control form in which the
experimenter did not count the cylinders. This was included to
check the role which the counting played in the responses of the
'treatment' group.
In addition, adult subjects were included in the experiment
to help us arrive at a correct assessment of the developmental
significance of the responses of our young subjects. If adults
behaved in the same way as young children, there would be no grounds
for mailing any developmental conclusions from the experiment.
Specifically, if both adults and young children give the
Yes-responses, it may be indicated that the task is such that
the only interpretation which can be given is the situational
one.
Sub.iects:
(i) Thirty children ranging from 1| years 8 months to
k years 1 month in their ages (mean age I4 years 5 months).
The children attended nursery schools in Edinburgh, and
were of mixed social class.
(ii) Ten university students.
Materials:
(i) Coloured wooden blocks of one cubic inch size.
(ii) Plain wooden cylinders of height one inch, thickness
one-fifth of an inch and diameter approximately one inch,
(iii) Two crumpled pieces of paper.
(iv) Two square wooden boxes, each about four and a half
inches deep and wide.
Design:
The children were placed in two equal groups. The treatment
group was denoted as Group I, while the control group was denoted
as Group IA.
The adults made up a third group denoted as Group IB. This
group received the same treatment as Group I.
Procedure:
The experimenter (E) and the subject (s) sat at adjacent sides
of a square table with S to E's right. One of the two boxes, (Box 1)
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was kept on the table with three blocks of different colours and
three cylinders inside it. At the corner of the table, on E's
left, were nine other cylinders. Concealed under S's chair was
the second box, (Box 2), with about seventeen cylinders and two
crumpled pieces of paper in it.








Box 2 concealed under
S1s chair
E
To begin with, E asked some general questions of S to put him
at ease. Following this, the following dialogue was initiated:
11
E - Have you ever tried to build a tower?
S - Yes/No
E - Good, and that is what we are going to play at now. ' ' You will
build your own tower, I will build my own tower, and we shall
see whose tower is going to be the taller one, okay?
(E then took out the blocks and cylinders from Box 1).
E - These are two things (indicating each one with the left hand)
that we have on the table, shall we use these ones or shall
we use these ones for building the towers?
(S could choose the blocks or the cylinders).
For Blocks - Choice
E - Those ones, what are they called?
S - Blocks
E - They are called "blocks, good.
For Cylinders - Choice
E - Why don't we use these ones (indicating the "blocks), shall we?
S - Alright
E - Good, what are they called?
S - Blocks
E - They are called "blocks, good.
(So all subjects were persuaded explicitly to agree to use the
"blocks.)
For "both the blocks-choice and the cylinders-choice the
experimenter continued by saying:-
E - Right, well, we haven't got enough of them, have we? . So I must
get some more.
For the next 15 seconds or so E engaged in one of two acts
depending on the group to which S belonged. In both cases
the act was carried out in complete silence. All questions
and comments from S were ignored.
Group I and Group IB (Treatment)
E counted the cylinders on the table including the ones placed
on her left. As e:q?lained in the introduction section, this counting
was expected to suggest to the subject that the cylinders as well
would be used for building the towers.
Group IA (Control)
E cleaned her nose with tissue paper. She did not count the
cylinders.
Some few seconds following the act in each case, E, indicating
Box 2 with her index finger, put the critical question of the
task to S ,
E - 'Are there any more of them in that box under your chair?"
Care was taken to ask the question in a tone and manner
which would make S feel that E had no previous knowledge
of the presence of the box or at least of its contents.
Keeping the crumpled pieces of paper in the box was part
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of the effort to give this impression.
Apart from the responses mentioned in the introduction to
the experiment, another kind of response was found during our
pilot studies. This was 'Which one (do you mean)?'. This
response was taken to imply an uncertainty as to whether to give
considerable weight to the suggestion about using the cylinders.
Scoring:
Responses were placed in three main categories. These were
named a) Yes-response, b) No-response and c) Question-response.
The Yes-response category was further sub-divided into
failure-response and elaborated-response categories.
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Responses placed in the first sub-category included, 'Yes',
'Yes, look', 'There, there are some', and simple nodding of the
subject's head.
Responses placed in the second sub-category included, 'Yes,
not some of those kind (that is, blocks)', and 'Yes, only these'.
(The distinction between the two sub-categories followed from the
description given in the introduction section.)
The responses which were placed in the No-response category
included, 'No', 'No, there is only these (cylinders)', 'No, these
are the round ones', 'Only these ones', and simple shaking of the
subject's head.
Finally, responses placed in the Question-response category
included, 'Of them (cylinders)?', and 'Any more of them
(cylinders)?'. Subjects who gave responses of this last kind were
counter-questioned to enforce a decision from them so as to enable
their placement in one of the first two categories. Where a subject
decided after this further questioning that the experimenter could
be referring to the cylinders, (that is, if he gave considerable weight
to the suggestion about the cylinders) he was placed in the Yes-
response category. Where, on the other hand, he decided that the
experimenter meant the blocks, he was placed in the No-response
category.
Those who refused to make a decision at this point were taken
as not wanting to regard the question as referring to the cylinders,
and were subsequently placed in the No-response category.
In analysing the results, the number of subjects who gave
considerable weight to the suggestion about the cylinders were compared
with the numbers who ignored it - that is,
Yes-responses (in general) were compared to No-responses.
Then, the numbers of subjects who gave the failure-response were
compared with the numbers who did not do so; that is,
Failure-responses were compared to elaborated
responses and No-responses.
It should be noted that a question-response leaves no doubt
that a subject has both the blocks and cylinders in mind. Even
where a subject consequently decides that the experimenter could
be referring to the cylinders, it cannot be suggested that he
failed to think about the blocks. Therefore, a subject who
gave a question-response was not placed in the failure-response
sub-category.
Other questions put to subjects on the task
After they had responded to the critical question of the
task, subjects were given some other exploratory questions, and
the responses to these were also analyzed. These questions are
given below, together with the different responses expected for
them. They are referred to as Q1, Q2 and Q3« The set of
questions for each subject depended on which of the above
response-categories he fell into, and also on which of the two
conditions (treatment and control) he was given.
Q1 was given to failure-response subjects, regardless of
condition.
Q2 and Q3 were given to all treatment subjects, regardless
of the response category.
0,1 - What did we not have enough of and I was going to get more
of them?
S - Blocks/Cylinders/l don't know.
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(This question was included to test further subjects' memory
for the aspect of the task which preceded the experimenter's
distracting activity.)
The number of subjects who gave indication of remembering what the
experimenter said about the blocks was compared with the number that
gave no such indication; that is, 'Blocks' replies were compared
to replies such as 'Cylinders' and 'I don't know'.
02 - You saw me doing this (E repeats counting) just now, what
did you think I was doing when I was doing that?
S - Counting them/l don't know.
Q3 - And what did you think I was going to do with them after
counting them?
S - Build with them/l don't know.
(02 and Q3 were included as aids for more direct evidence
that the experimenter's counting was indeed seen as suggesting
that the cylinders as well were to be used for the towers.
A subject was given Q3 only if he claimed in response to 02
that the experimenter was counting the cylinders.)
The number of subjects that explicitly assumed that the cylinders
were going to be used was compared with the number that denied
making the assumption, that is, 'Build with them' replies were
compared to 'I don't know' replies.
Before we go on to the results, we shall specify the particular
similarities between the tower-building task and the conservation task.
Similarities between the tower-building task and the conservation task
1) On both tasks, the experimenter begins by explicitly
suggesting something in speech; in one case, that quantity will be
compared, in the other, that towers will he built with blocks.
2) On both, the initial verbal suggestion is followed by
an act from the experimenter. This is the outstanding
similarity between the tasks.
3) In each task, the experimenter's act is suggestive. In
one case, the act suggests that attributes other than quantity
will be compared. In the second case, it is suggested that a
material other than the one implied in the experimenter's speech
will be used.
1;) Finally, as already noted, the suggestion from the
experimenter's act in both tasks leads to an understanding which
is different from the more literal interpretation of the critical
question.
Results;
TABLE iu 1 (a)
Eumbers of subjects in the different response-categories
N Yes-responses No-responses Question-responses
GROUP I
1+ years 8 months
- I4 years 2 months
15 11 (+1) 2 (+1) 2 (-2)
GROUP IA
I+ years 8 months
- J4. years 1 month
15 2 13 -
GROUP IB
Adults 10 - 7 (+3) 3 (-3)
The plus and minus signs show how the question-responses
transferred to the other two response—categories with further
questioning.
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1) 12 of the 15 (80%) young treatment subjects gave
Yes-responses. The remaining 3 (20%) gave No-responses.
Among the control subjects, on the other hand, only 2 (13%),
gave Yes-responses. The rest gave No-responses. This difference
between the two groups was significant (p < 0.005, Fisher exact
probability test).
2) All the adult subjects gave No-responses. The difference
between them and the young treatment group was significant
(p < 0.005, Fisher exact probability test).
TABLE U.1 (b)








GROUP I 15 9 2 (+1) 2 (+1)
GROUP IA 15 1 1 13
9 of the 15 (60%) young treatment subjects gave the failure-
response. This compares with only one (6.67%) of the control
subjects. The difference between the groups was significant,
(p < 0.01, Fisher exact probability test).
TABLE It. 1 (c)
Responses given to Q,1 by the failure-response subjects
N Q1
Blocks Cylinders I don't know
GROUP I 9 6 2 1
GROUP IA 1 1 - -
1) 6 of the 9 (67%) failure-response subjects from the
young treatment group gave evidence in their replies to question
0,1 that they remembered what went before the experimenter's
interfering act on the task.
2) The one failure-response subject from the control group
did the same.
TABLE U.1 (d)
Responses given to questions 0,2 and Q3
by the treatment subjects
N 02 03
Counting them I don't know Build them I don't know
GROUP I 15 11+ 1 11 3
GROUP IB 10 10 - 5 5
1) All but one (93%) of the young treatment subjects stated
that they saw the experimenter's distracting movement to the
cylinders as one of counting. 11 of the subjects (73%) claimed
that they considered that the cylinders were going to be used for
the towers.
2) All the adult subjects claimed that they saw the
experimenter's act as one of counting. Half of them claimed
that they thought the cylinders were going to be used. The
difference between the two groups in the numbers that made the
claim was not significant. (Fisher exact probability test).
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Discussion
The results in Table 1+.1 (a) that 80% of the young treatment
subjects gave Yes-responses while only 13% of the young control
subjects did so, indicates that the experimenter's counting, at
least, was responsible for the Yes-responses of the treatment subjects.
If we take it for granted that it was the suggestion generated by the
counting that was responsible for the responses, this result, together
with the result that none of the adult subjects gave Yes-responses
(Table I4.. 1 (a)), suggests that young children give more weight to
situational suggestions than others do when responding to test
questions.
On its part, the result that many of the Yes-responses of the
young treatment group was of the failure-response kind (Table l;. 1 (8)),
suggests that young children may fail on Piagetian concrete-operations
tasks merely because they give considerable weight to what the
situations suggest about the experimenter's intentions for the
critical questions asked.
However, this second (and more important here) conclusion might
be challenged. It could be argued that subjects who gave the
failure-response, whether or not they did so as a result of the
situation of the task, did not understand the critical question as
referring to the blocks at the same time as the cylinders. In
other words, the subjects who gave the response might actually have
failed to think about the blocks. Should this have been the case,
we will not be justified in making the above conclusion. It is
unlikely, however, that the argument can be sustained.
To begin with, there is the evidence from the responses given
to question (Table I4.I (c)).
The replies suggest that the subjects thought all the time of the
blocks. Apart from this evidence, many of the subjects, after
building happily with the cylinders asked the experimenter where
they could obtain 'the blocks' from. It could be considered,
though, that the kind of evidence is not particularly reliable.
It would have been possible for our subjects to recall what was
said about the blocks at the time of question Q1, even though they
had failed to do so at the time of the critical question. However,
there is another kind of evidence in favour of the argument that
this was not the case.
The evidence comes from the fact that our subjects assumed that
1 3
the cylinders will be used for building. The assumption derived
partly from the idea communicated in the experimenter's speech that
the blocks will be used for this purpose. One must recognise that
the fact that the cylinders by themselves could be used for towers,
and the fact that the experimenter's counting was consistent with
the idea of obtaining more of something, could not on their own have
generated that assumption. The counting should have led to the
assumption being made only partly because it was initially indicated
in the experimenter's speech that towers were to be built5 and with
the blocks. The idea being pressed is similar to the one which was
observed in the last chapter for the suggested influence of the
transformation action in the Conservation test. A particular aspect
may appear to dominate the individual's judgement, but that aspect
does not have influence independently of other related aspects.
However, under the circumstances described, a subject who gives
weight to the suggestion about the cylinders must at the same time
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take account of the idea that the "blocks will "be used. Our subjects
who believed cylinders to be accepted by the experimenter, and gave
the failure-response as a result, must, therefore, have had the
blocks in mind.
There is, however, a further objection which could be raised.
It could be considered that our subjects might after all have given
little weight to the suggestion about the cylinders when interpreting
the critical question. The experimenter's counting might have
influenced the responses of the young treatment subjects for quite
different reasons.
To begin with, many of the young and adult subjects for whom
the experimenter counted the cylinders did claim that they assumed
that the material was going to be used (Table l+.l (d)). Added to
this evidence were the comments made by some of the young subjects
while the experimenter made the count. There were comments like,
'What are you doing that for?', and 'Are we going to use them
(cylinders) too?'. With these results it cannot be suggested, at
least, that the subjects might not even have seen the counting as
having implications for the task. It is noted that in comparison
with 73% of the young subjects, only 50% of the adult ones claimed
that they had made the assumption. This difference was not found
to be significant and it can probably be explained.
The adults, unlike the young subjects, gave the impression of
being very concerned or anxious about the experimenter's reason
for wanting to know what they had assumed. It appears as if they
felt that the whole idea of the testing had to do with the answers
to the questions about the assumption (questions Q2 and Q3), even
though none of them succeeded in making out the real reasons for the
questions. This anxiety over the judgements which the experimenter
intended to make about the responses could have acted to restrain
some of the adults from volunteering their thoughts regarding the
act. Considering this observation, we can take it that most of
the subjects tested must have made the assumption which it was
expected that the act would ordinarily generate. However, it could
be suggested that it need not follow from this that the assumption
was responsible for the responses of the young subjects.
It could be considered for the failure-response in particular
that, at the same time as suggesting that the cylinders would be
used, the experimenter's counting might have been capable of causing
subjects to fixate on the cylinders. Young subjects are supposed
to be highly susceptible to the kind of influence. Such fixating
can only result in a failure to think about the blocks. And this,
it could be explained, could have led the children to interpret the
question as they did. The adult subjects, on the other hand, would
not have given the failure-response because they are less susceptible
to the kind of influence.
Actually each adult subject was asked at the end of his testing
why he did not see the question as referring to the cylinders. The
most common reason given was that what the experimenter had talked
about were the blocks. Upon being reminded of the fact that they
had claimed that they got the impression that the material was going
to be used as well, they only insisted more strongly that the
experimenter had talked only about the blocks. This reasoning was
taken to imply that the adults exercised a deliberate discrimination
against the suggestion because of its non-verbal origin.
It appears then that the adults did not take the critical question
to refer to the cylinders, not because they did not fixate on it,
but because the suggestion about it was not given directly in the
experimenter's speech.
However, this result does not necessarily argue for the
conclusion that the young subjects, on their part, did not give
their responses because they fixated on the cylinders, and forgot
about the blocks. The kind of explanation which holds for the
responses of the adult subjects does not have to hold for the
responses of the young ones.
The experiment which we shall be reporting next, further
investigated the assumption that the situational suggestion about




The aim of the experiment was to investigate the role of the
situational suggestion about using the cylinders in the responses
of our young subjects.
It was reasoned that if the suggestion about using the cylinders
was not responsible for the responses of the subjects, the same kind
of responses as before (Yes-responses) should be given when the
situation of the task is such that an assumption about use cannot
be made. If, however, the suggestion about using the cylinders was
responsible for the Yes-responses, we considered, a different kind of
response (No-responses) should be given in such different circumstances
This was the consideration on which the present experiment was based.
It is the same kind of consideration on which McGarrigle and his
colleagues based their investigation of conservation and class
inclusion behaviour.
To achieve the desired kind of situation, we now employed a
material with which one cannot build towers. It was claimed while
describing the task in the first experiment that the fact that the
cylinders can be used for building towers was expected to assist the
suggestion that they will be used for the purpose. Where the
material counted on the task cannot be used for building, there
should be no suggestion of use from its being counted. The
experiment involved a new group of young children, and the material
used to replace the cylinders was marbles. Most young children
are familiar with marbles, and it was hoped that the ones tested
would know from their experience with them that one cannot use them
to build anything like a tower.
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Subjects:
Fifteen nursery school children ranging in age from
k years and 9 months to 1+ years (mean age I4. years and
5 months).
Materials:
The same as for the first experiment, except that marbles
replaced the cylinders.
Design:
There was only one group of children; denoted as Group II.
All subjects were treated to the same condition.
The results obtained were compared with those obtained for
the young treatment subjects (Group I) in the first experiment.
Procedure:
This was given as for Groups I and ID in the first experiment;
marbles taking the place of cylinders as already explained.
Question Q1 was considered to be no longer necessary, so it
was omitted from the procedure.
Results:
TABLE It.2 (a)
Numbers of subjects in the different response-categories
N Yes-responses No-responses Question-responses
GROUP II
1+ years 9 months -
I4 years
15 5 (+1) 7 (+2) 3 (-3)
GROUP I
I4. years 8 months -
1+ years 2 months
15 11 (+1) 2 (+1) 2(-2)
96.
The number of subjects who gave Yes-responses in the present
experiment was much less than the number that did so in the last
one. 60% of the present subjects, in comparison with only 20%
of the last one, gave No-responses. The difference was just
significant (p < 0.05, Fisher exact probability test).
TABLE h.2 (b)








GROUP II 15 h 1 (+1) 7 (+2)
GROUP I 15 9 2 (+1) 2 (+1)
The number of subjects who gave the failure-response in the
present experiment was less than the number that did so in
Experiment i+.I. The difference between the results, however, was
not significant (Fisher exact probability test).
TABLE Ii. 2 (c)
Responses given to questions 02 and Q,3
N 02 03
Counting them I don't know Build them I don't know
GROUP II 15 11* 1 1+ 10
GROUP I 15 1U 1 11 3
All but one (93%) of the Group II subjects claimed that they saw
the experimenter's distracting movement toward the marbles as one of
counting. Only I; (27%) subjects claimed that they assumed that the
marbles were going to be used for the towers. The difference between
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the number of subjects who thought the marbles would be used
and the number that thought the same for the cylinders in the first
experiment was significant (p < 0.025, Fisher exact probability test).
Discussion:
The result in Table i+.2 (a) that few of the subjects in the
present experiment gave Yes-responses confirms that the situational
suggestion about using cylinders in the first experiment was
responsible for the Yes-responses of the young subjects there.
The further result that few of the subjects in the present
experiment gave the failure-response (Table Ij.. 2 (b)), similarly
confirms that the suggestion about using the cylinders in the first
experiment was responsible for the failure-response of the young
subjects there.
However, the number of subjects who gave the Yes-responses in
the present experiment was only a little less than one would expect
to occur by chance alone. The second result was not significant.
These weak results imply that we will not be'right in claiming on
account of the second experiment alone, that the suggestion in the
first experiment was responsible for the responses of the young
subjects there. Nevertheless, one could still consider the
possibility of an alternative explanation for the results of this
last experiment. The very direction of the results encourages this.
The results in Table 1+.2 (c) suggest that most of the subjects
in the experiment did not think that the marbles were to be used for
building towers. Nevertheless, it is still possible that many of
them wondered whether the experimenter knew of a way of building
with the material. The typical comment made by some of the subjects
while the experimenter counted it can probably be taken as supporting
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this notion. This was 'How are we going to "build with those ones?'.
If this should have been the case, the subjects could have
experienced a strong pull between a prior knowledge that marbles
cannot be used to build towers, and a thought that the experimenter
might have a plan to use them for the purpose. This should have
caused more of them than might have done so, to take the critical
question to refer to the material; and, therefore, to give
Yes-responses.
A main reason for suspecting that the subjects might after all
have wondered whether the marbles will be used is the suggestive
value in the task of the experimenter's counting. The act, we noted
before, is strongly consistent with the idea of obtaining more of
what was needed for the towers. This meaning of the act should
have a very powerful effect on the judgement made about any material
that it is performed upon in that kind of situation. It could,
therefore, have served to induce the subjects in the present
experiment to wonder whether the marbles will be used. It is worth
noting in this regard, findings which show that young children's
reactions to relatively neutral objects can be significantly
influenced by the name or use suggested for the objects.
Grieve, Hoogenraad and Murray (1977) for example, presented
children aged 2 years to 3 years 9 months with large (10 cubic cm)
and small (6 cubic cm) open pliable cardboard boxes to carry out
instructions involving the prepositions 'in', 'on', and 'under'.
In different tasks with the same children, the same two boxes were
referred to as, table and cup; bath and baby; - and table and chair.
Young as these children were, they reacted differently to the
prepositions as the names of the boxes were changed. One of the
important implications of this result is that even very young
children can he highly susceptible to the kind of suggestion
involved; easily treating one object as if it were another, or
as if it could serve as another object.
In a similar fashion to Grieve et al, one can consider the
experimenter's counting of the marbles in our task as equivalent
to giving them the name 'building material'. If the children
take the material as such temporarily, then they should react
to it accordingly.
It follows from the explanation offered that we need not take
the results of the experiment to mean that the suggestion about
using the cylinders in Experiment li.1 was not responsible for the
responses of the young subjects there, for a similar suggestion
might have been arrived at about the marbles to account for the
results in Experiment I4.. 2.
Another conclusion, which would follow, is that we should never
base our expectations of young children's behaviour on our
expectations of adult behaviour alone. This conclusion
substantiates the results from the studies mentioned in chapter 2
which show that children sometimes arrive at assumptions which,
from an adult point of view, are odd and unexpected.
It also follows for Piagetian concrete-operations tests that
children may arrive at alternative situational interpretations of
questions when we least expect them to, and they may, therefore,
fail when we least expect them to. This is something which has
to be borne in mind when the presence of specific cognitive abilities
is the main concern. Quite often, this is the primary aim for
giving tests to children; the eventual aim, usually, being to
determine which children will require which instructions. In such
circumstances, it will be necessary to avoid those situations which
would cause them to give incorrect situational interpretations, and
so fail to display abilities which they in fact possess.
The experiment reported next, like the present one, was
concerned with investigating the position that the situational
suggestion about using the cylinders was responsible for the
responses of the subjects in the first one. We considered that
such further investigation was necessary in spite of the explanation
offered for the not-so-significant results of the present one.
Experiment U.3
Introduction:
The investigation here was based on the same consideration as
that of the last experiment; that is, if the suggestion about
using the cylinders was not responsible for the responses of the
subjects in Experiment l+.l, the same kind of responses as before
(Yes-responses) should be given when the situation of the task is
such that an assumption about use cannot be made. To achieve this
in the present experiment, instead of counting the cylinders as
before, the experimenter shook them noisily in both hands. Now,
this act can only have negative implications for the given
objective of the task. Unlike the act of counting, it is not
at all consistent with the idea of obtaining more of whatever
is of use for building the towers. The consistency of that act
in the task, we explained in the introduction to Experiment I4..I, was
expected to contribute partly to the suggestion that the cylinders
would be used. The shaking act being inconsistent, therefore, it
was not expected for its situation that subjects would assume
that the material would be used.
The experiment involved a new group of young children.
Subjects:
Fifteen nursery school children ranging in age from
5 years 0 months to I4 years 0 months (mean age 1+ years and 6 months).
Materials:
The same as for Experiment I4.1.
Design:
There was only one group of children; denoted as Group III.
102.
All the children were treated to the same condition.
The results obtained were compared with those obtained for
the young treatment subjects (Group i) in the first experiment.
Procedure:
The task was given as in the first experiment, except that
instead of counting the cylinders, the experimenter gathered them
in both hands and shook them noisily for some 15 seconds.
Results:
TABLE lx.8 (a)
Numbers of subjects in the different response-categories
N Yes-responses No-responses Question-responses
GROUP III
5 years - 15 3 (+1) 9 (+2) 3 (-3)-
U years
GROUP I
1+ years 8 months
- years 2 mths
15 11 (+1) 2 (+1) 2 (-2)
The number of subjects who gave Yes-responses in the present
experiment was much less than the number that did so in the first one.
The difference was significant (p < 0.01, Pisher exact probability
test).
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TABLE lu 3 (b)








GROUP III 15 2 2 9 (+2)
GROUP I 15 9 2 (+1) 2 (+1)
The number of subjects who gave the failure-response in the
present experiment was much less than the number that did so in
the first one. The difference was significant (p.< 0.025,
Eisher exact probability test).
TABLE II. 3 (c)
Responses given to questions 02 and 0,3
N 02 03
Shaking them I don't know Build them I don't know
GROUP III 15 10 5 h 6
GROUP I 15 1k 1 11 3
67% of the Group III subjects claimed that they took the
experimenter's distracting movement to the cylinders to be one of
shaking. Only 21% of the subjects claimed to have assumed that the
cylinders would be used for the towers. The difference between the
experiment and the first one in the number that made the assumption
was significant (p < 0.025, Eisher exact probability test).
Discussion:
The result in Table I4.3 (a) that only a few of the subjects in
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the present experiment gave Tes-responses indicates that the
suggestion about using the cylinders in the first experiment was
responsible for the Yes-responses of the young subjects there.
The result in Table i+.3 (t>) that only a few of the subjects
in the experiment gave the failure-response also suggests that the
suggestion about using the cylinders was responsible for the
failure-response of the young subjects in Experiment 1;. 1.
Unlike the outcome of the last experiment, the two results of
the present one were satisfactorily significant. They leave no
doubts, therefore, about the role of the suggestion in Experiment I4..I.
The results of the present experiment were also taken to
suggest that some explanation of the kind which we offered must
account for the results obtained in Experiment 1;.2. In other words,
they support the explanation there that, more subjects than
expected gave Yes-responses because more of them than admitted it
must have assumed that the marbles would be used for building. If
this was not the case, it would be difficult to reconcile the results
of Experiments U.2 and 1+.3*
Apart from this indirect support, the present results also
constitute direct support for that explanation. The presumed
suggestive value of the experimenter's counting was put forward as
an agent for the consideration that the marbles would be used. Here,
unlike the case in that experiment, cylinders were employed which
can easily be used for building towers. However, the cylinders
were not counted by the experimenter as before. Instead, an
inconsistent act was performed on them. In a way, the fact that
most of the subjects tested did not arrive at an assumption that
the material would be used in building (Table 1+.3 (c))> confirmed
the suggestive value of the counting in the marble experiment.
There is, however, one slight problem for our results. It
could be considered that the suggestion generated by the experimenter'
act influenced our young subjects, partly because the act immediately
preceded the critical question. This is what is described in
psychology as the recency-effect; that is, a subject is influenced
by the more recent position of a stimulus item; he reacts to it
because it is presented last. It has been observed for many
learning situations that young children are more susceptible to
this particular effect than others are, and it is taken into
consideration in many cognitive tasks, including Piaget's.
However, if our young subjects could have given less weight to
the suggestion from the experimenter's act, were the act differently
placed, it will be necessary to modify the claim that children give
more weight to situational suggestions than others do when
interpreting test questions. The next experiment was conducted
to investigate this hypothesis.
Experiment U.U
Introduction:
This experiment aimed to investigate the role of the temporal
relationship between the situational suggestion and the critical
question in our task in the use of the former by subjects.
As might be expected, the manner in which the investigation
was carried out was to present subjects with a suggestion that the
cylinders will be used at a very early stage of the task (and not just
prior to the critical question as before). This change in the
position of the non-verbal suggestion made necessary a few
modifications in the task. These will be described a little later
on, and as will be seen, the changes do not alter the principles of
the task.
The experiment was carried out with a new group of subjects.
The consideration made was that if only a few of the young subjects
tested under the circumstances gave Yes-responses, it will mean
that the temporal nearness of the situational suggestion and the
question in our experiments has a part to play in the influence of
the suggestion on subjects' interpretations.
Since the task was being given in a new form, it was considered
appropriate to test some adult subjects along with the young ones.
It was felt that it could be suggested that the kind of difference
found between the two groups with the last form should not necessarily
be assumed for the new form; that is, even if it were to be found
with the new form that young subjects again give a lot of weight to the
situational suggestion, it would not be impossible that adult
subjects would this time do the same. As we pointed out in the
introduction to the first experiment, if adults behave in the same
way as young children in the kind of situation, there will be little
point in drawing special conclusions about young children from the
results.
Subjects;
(i) Fifteen nursery school children ranging from I4 years and
8 months to 1+ years and 1 month in age (mean age U years
and 5 months).
(ii) Ten university students.
Materials:
These were the same as for the first experiment.
Design:
There was only one group of children denoted as Group IV.
There was only one group of adults denoted as Group 173.
All subjects were treated to the same condition.
The results obtained were compared with those obtained for
the young treatment subjects (Group i) and adult subjects (Group IB)
in the first experiment.
Procedure:
The setting was the same as for the previous form of the task.
Without saying anything or replying to any statements from the
subject (s), the experimenter (e) built a tower with the cylinders
lying to the left of the table. This was expected to suggest to
subjects that towers will be built with the cylinders. In the
same quiet manner that she built the tower, e dismantled it. After
the dismantling, e picked up Box 1 sitting on the table and took out
the blocks from it. e then entered into the following dialogue with S.
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E - What are these (indicating the blocks) called?
S - Blocks
E - They are called blocks, good.
Bo you know what we shall be doing in this game?
We shall be building towers, and tall ones at that.
You will build one and I will build one too.
Some few seconds after, E, indicating Box 2 with her index finger,
presented the critical question:-
E - Are there any of them in that box under your chair?
The differences between the -present form of the task and the former
one
1) Unlike in the former situation, in the present one E
actually built a tower with the cylinders. It was felt that if
the assumption about the cylinders was to be induced at the
initial stage of the task, and through an act of the experimenter's
as before, this was probably the only way in such circumstances in
which to achieve the communication. It could be asked why this
method of making the suggestion was not adopted in the former task.
The reason is that as things were in that situation, building with
the cylinders would have been quite inconsistent or abnormal.
2) In the present task, unlike in the previous one, E did not
make a direct suggestion about building with the blocks. But the
suggestion was still a verbal one and clear enough. The reason
for the less direct method was that it was felt that a too direct
verbal suggestion about the blocks in the kind of situation could
have produced a counter-suggestion that the cylinders were not really
intended for use, should the assumption have been arrived at in the
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beginning.
3) The word 'more' is absent from the question of the present
task. It was felt that it would have been out of place should it
have been included. It was not indicated here, as in the former one,
that more of something was going to be obtained, and neither was
anything counted. Both these factors made the idea of 'more' in the
question for the previous form of the task seem in order.
Important similarities and essential qualification:
As we observed in the introduction to the experiment, the
principles of the present form of our task are the same as those
of the previous form. Since the new form resembles the first
experiment in particular, we shall make comparisons with it. In
both cases the experimenter's act makes a suggestion which leads to
the interpretation that the critical question refers to the cylinders
as well as the blocks.
While the same kinds of responses should be given here as before,
there is a slight difference in the possible implications of the
Yes-responses. The difference is created by the fact that there
can be no question of failing to think about the blocks in the
situation. The suggestion about using the cylinders is presented
first, the one about the blocks only after it. If a subject gives
the non-elaborated Yes-response, therefore, it will not be possible
to suggest as before that he does this because of a failure to attend
to what the experimenter said about the blocks. In other words,
the response cannot be termed a 'failure-response'.
In any case, what was of greater interest in the experiment was
finding out whether or not our subjects will give Yes-responses in
general; that is, whether or not they will give a situational
interpretation to the critical question. Placing the responses
into the failure and elaborated sub-categories was, therefore, not
warranted. This condition, however, was no reason why the number




Numbers of subjects in the different response-categories
'
N Yes-responses No-responses Question-responses
Group IV
1+ years 8 months -
k years 1 month
15 10 (+1) 3 (+1) 2 (-2)
Group I
U years 8 months -
1+ years 2 months
15 11 (+1) 2 (+1) 2 (-2)
Group IVB
Adults 10 2 7 (+1) 1 (-1)
Group IB
Adults 10 7 (+3) 3 (-3)
1) The number of young subjects who gave Yes-responses in the
present experiment (Group IV) was nearly the same as the
number that did so in the first (Group I). There was no
significant difference between the two results (Fisher exact
probability test).
2) There was a significant difference in the present experiment
between the adult subjects and the young ones in the kinds of
responses given (p < 0.025, Fisher exact probability test).
3) The number of adult subjects who gave No-responses in the
present experiment (Group iVis) was nearly the same as the numb
that did so in the first one (Group IB). There was no
significant difference between the two results (Fisher exact
probability test).
TABLE h.h (b)
Numbers of non-elaborated Yes-response and







Group IV 9 1 (+D 3 (+1)
Group I 15 9 2 (+1) 2 (+1)
The number of subjects who gave the non-elaborated
Yes-response (failure-response) in the present experiment
was the same as the number that did so in the first one.
Discussion;
The result that almost as many young subjects as before gave
the Yes-responses (first result, Table I4.I+ (a)), indicates that
the position of the suggestion in our task has no part to play in
its influence on the subjects' interpretations.
The result that most of the adult subjects did not give the
Yes-responses (second and third results Table i+.i+ (a)), helps to
confirm that these responses are not the only ones which can be
given in the situation.
Recalling the consideration made at the end of the discussion of
the last experiment, it is suggested that we need not modify
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the claim that children give more weight to situational suggestions
than others do when interpreting test questions.
The result that many of the young subjects tested gave the non-
elaborated Yes-response (Table Ip. 1+ (b)) helps in a way to substantiate
the finding for the first experiment regarding the failure-response.
However, there is an important criticism which might be made against
the methodology of the present task. This criticism has to do with the
fact that the experimenter actually built a tower with the cylinders to
induce the assumption that the material will be used. It could be
considered that the suggestion was given an emphasis which it was not
given in the first form of the task. This, it could be argued, might
account partly for the fact that many of the young subjects tested gave
it weight. This explanation, like the recency-effect one, will call
for a modification of the claim that children give more weight to what
situations suggest about experimenter's meaning for test questions.
The evidence which we have to counter this objection comes from the
responses of the adult subjects who did not give much weight to the
suggestion. If it was emphasized that much, most of the adults should
have given it weight. It follows that even if it were true that the
suggestion was given a little more emphasis than before, the added
emphasis was not so much as to cause subjects to take it into strong
account if they do not normally do such in test situations. Also,
it is possible to argue that the suggestion was not unduly emphasized.
Actually building towers with the cylinders may be no more direct an
action than counting them as before. The two kinds of actions should
be equally engaging.
A general discussion of the experiments will be given in
chapter f.
Chapter 5
Conservation and the Tower-Building Task Compared
Introduction
The experiment reported in this chapter puts to test the assumed
relationship between the interpretative behaviour of children in the
traditional Conservation Task and the Tower Building Task.
We administered the tower task and the number conservation task
to a new group of children. The idea was that if the children who
fail to conserve on the conservation task are the same ones who give
Yes-responses on the tower task, and if the ones who give conserving
responses are also the ones who give No-responses on the tower task,
the assumption that children respond to the conservation question in
the same way that they respond to the critical question in the tower
task will be considerably strengthened.
We still have not shown an age affect for behaviour on the tower
task; something which has been shown repeatedly for conservation.
This new experiment will be an opportunity to do so since we expect
to have young non-conserving children as well as slightly older
conserving children. Any age effects found will serve as additional
support for the assumption that children behave on the Conservation
test as they do on the tower test.
Subjects:
(i) Fifteen nursery school children ranging from
I4. years 8 months to I;. years in age (mean age
I4 years 1+-J- months).
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(ii) Seventeen primary school children ranging from 5 years
8 months to 1; years 11 months (mean age 5 years 3 months).
Materials:
(i) The materials for the tower-bnilding task were the same
as for the first experiment.
(ii) The materials for the number conservation task were blue
and orange coloured counters of 1-J inch diameter.
Design:
All the children were treated to the same condition. Each child
received the two tasks in a single testing session. The tower task
11+
was always given first.
Procedure:
The tower-building task was administered here as in the first
experiment.
The number conservation task was given in both the number
equal and number unequal forms.
In the number equal situation, two rows of four counters were
formed. In the number unequal situation, on the other hand, one
row had four counters and the other had five.
One half of the children received the number equal situation
first, and the other half received the number ■unequal situation
first.
The introduction to the task consisted of the experimenter
asking the child what the counters were or looked like. The
experimenter then went on to inform him that the game to be
played with the !counters1 will involve E arranging them on the
table and asking some questions about them. The child was also
warned to attend very carefully to the questions.
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Following the preliminaries, E arranged the counters in
one-to-one correspondence, and then asked:
E - Is there more here or more here or are they both the same number?
(with E indicating each row in turn)
After a correct judgement of the rows, E said,
E - Now watch
Upon this statement, E went on to move the counters in one row
till they touched each other. The row transformed was always
the one nearer to E. (This row was also the more numerous one
in the number unequal situation.) One colour was transformed
in one situation while the other colour was transformed in the
other.
Following the transformation, the above question was asked
once more -
E - Is there more here or more here or are they both the same number?
Where a subject gave a non-conserving judgement, s/he was
asked to count the counters in each row, and the conservation
question was then repeated.
Where a subject gave a conserving judgement, on the other hand,
s/he was given further questions like,
E - Or does this row have more? (with E indicating the longer row).
Scoring:
Subjects were scored either as giving a conserving response or
a non-conserving response, and either as giving a Yes-response or a
No-response on the tower-building task. (Subjects were scored as
giving conserving responses even if they did so in only one of the two
conservation situations. However, this happened for two children
only).
A 2x2 contingency table was designed which allowed us to
place subjects in the following four categories, indicative of
performance correlation.
A - Yes-response and a conserving response
B - No-response and a conserving response
C - Yes-response and a non-conserving response
D - No-response and a non-conserving response
To investigate age-related performance,separate 2x2
contingency tables were designed for the tasks which allowed us














2i| of the 32 subjects showed similar performance on the
tower-building task and the number conservation task (cells B and C).
The^ difference in performance, on- the, tower building task by con-
servers and non—conservers was found to be significant, (p < .OIj
Chi-sauare test).
TABLE g (b)
Responses on the tower task by the different age groups




The number of primary school subjects that gave Yes-responses
was relatively less than the number of nursery school subjects that
did so. The difference was found to be just significant (p < 0.05,
Chi-square test).
TABLE 5 (c)
Responses on the number task by the different age groups








The number of primary school subjects who gave non-conserving
responses was relatively less than the number of nursery school
subjects that did so. The difference was found to be significant
(p < 0.005j Chi-square test).
Discussion:
The results indicate that children respond to the conservation
question in the same way that they respond to the critical question
in the tower task. In most cases, the subjects who gave conserving
responses also gave No-responses on the tower task, and the subjects
who gave non-conserving responses gave the more situation-dependent
Yes-responses (Table 5 (a)). Moreover, it is indicated that as for
conservation, young children respond differently on the tower task as
they become older (Tables 5 (b) and 5> (c)).
However, it is worth noting that so far, our investigations have
involved utterances whose key terms possess only minimal lexical
content. For a more complete examination of the extent of children's
preferential reliance on situational clues rather than linguistic
ones, it is necessary to test children in circumstances where the
referent of the key expression is more determinate than is the case
with the diectic used in the tower task or the quantitative term used
in the conservation question. The experiment reported in the next
chapter was designed to do just this.
Chapter 6
The Black and White Boxes Task
Introduction
The experiment reported in this chapter was designed to find out
whether young children give preferential weight to situational
suggestions when responding to utterances involving lexical terms
with more determinate reference. A new kind of situation was
devised in which subjects were actually forced to choose between what
the experimenter says and what her action suggests.
The experiment began with the experimenter telling the child
that toy-men will be built up. By toy-men was meant figures which
are made up by slotting pieces on to a peg. The set given to the
child (to make up a London policeman) was an incomplete one. But
he did not discover this until he had used up all the pieces he
was given. The result of his effort was a policeman with a piece
obviously missing from it.
Upon the child's discovery of the loss, the experimenter went
on to suggest that she knew the whereabouts of the piece. There
were two boxes at opposite ends of the table at which the subject
sat with the experimenter; one was black and the other was white.
The experimenter named one of these two boxes as containing the missing
piece. However, at the same time as making the verbal statement, the
experimenter pointed directly at the box not named as if the missing
piece was contained in this.
In the circumstances described, it is just as likely for the
missing object to be in the box named as it is for the object to
be in the box pointed at. However, the object cannot be in the
two boxes at the same time and the subject is compelled to act
either on the basis of what the experimenter says or on the basis
of what her pointing suggests. It is reasonable to expect that
what course is taken will be determined largely by the amount of
weight assigned to what is said and what is done. Specifically,
the results of the experiments reported in chapter I|. will lead us
to expect that most young subjects will act on the basis of the
experimenter's pointing.
Subjects:
Twelve nursery school children ranging from 1+ years and
11 months to J4 years in age (mean age J4 years and 6 months).
Materials:
(i) Incomplete pieces of a pile-up London policeman.
Complete pieces of a pile-up upright cat.
(ii) Two square wooden boxes - about hfe inches deep and
kg- inches wide. One was painted white, and the
other painted black.
Design:
There was only one group of subjects and they were all
treated to the same condition.
Half of them had the experimenter naming the black box and
pointing at the white one. The other half had the reverse of
these conflicting instructions.
Procedure;
The experimenter (E) and the subject (s) sat opposite each
other at a square table. The two boxes were placed at the






The boxes were placed to be nearer to E than to S to prevent
S from getting a premature glimpse of their insides. (They were both
empty).
After some general questions to put S at ease, the following
dialogue was initiated;
E - Have you ever tried to build up toy-men?
S - Yes/No
E - We are going to build up toy-men, and we want to see who is
15
going to be first to finish building.
E went on to produce the pile-up pieces from a previously
concealed cardboard box, giving S the incomplete set, and
herself the complete one. S was told that his pieces would




While E and S were both engaged in the task of piling up their
pieces, references to the two boxes on the table were discouraged.
Also, E always allowed S to finish first.
When S had slotted all his pieces, and in the correct order,
E exclaimed,
E - "You have finished! Oh, but it seems you have a piece missing
from your policeman. Now, where is it? I remember,
IT IS IN TEE BLACK/WHITE BOX" - and at -the same time -
E INDICATED THE WHITE/BLACK BOX with the index finger.
(E looks directly at S during this conflicting behaviour)
Scoring:
Three kinds of reactions were found during the pilot studies,
and these were named according to their nature.
a) Inert Reaction - Refusing to act or talk.
b) Question Reaction - Asking E which box she meant.
c) Spontaneous Reaction - Acting without much hesitation.
What E said to S following the reaction varied for the different
reactions.
a) Where S refused to look into one of the boxes or to ask
questions but simply fidget in his seat, he was told,
E - 'Go on, get it', or 'Go,on, look for it'.
(This was found to be quite effective in getting the subjects
into active motion.)
b) Where S asked which one E meant, he was asked in return
E - 'Which one do you think I mean?'
(The reply given to S's consequent choice was 'Yes' irrespective
of whether this was the box pointed at or the one named in
E's speech).
c) Where S acted without having to be urged on in any way,
nothing was said to him.
Since the two boxes were empty, whichever one S looked into,
the reaction was the same one of disappointment, and E only murmured
something about the missing piece being lost.
Subjects were categorized according to the above three reactions.
They were also categorized according to whether they eventually chose
to search the box named in E's speech or the one pointed at.
Results;
TABLE 6 (a)
Numbers of subjects giving the different reactions
a) Inert Reaction b) Question Reaction c) Spontaneous Reaction
8 2 2
N = 12
8 subjects gave the Inert Reaction, and 2 gave the Question
Reaction. Both reactions are indicative of uncertainty as to which
of the boxes to choose, and should, therefore, be lumped together.
When this is done, we see that 83% of the subjects had difficulty in
deciding which box contained the lost item.
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TABLE 6 (b)
Numbers of subjects searching the different boxes
Box pointed at Box named in E's speech
2 10
N = 12
83% of the subjects eventually chose to search the box named
in E's speech. (The 2 subjects who chose the box pointed at were
not exactly the ones who gave a Spontaneous reaction. One of the
2 subjects who showed this reaction chose the box named in E's
Discussion:
The result that all but two of the young children tested
experienced a conflict in the task (Table 6 (a)) indicates that
they understood what the experimenter said and also understood
that only two of the children gave the Question Reaction; which is
the reaction that one would expect from older children, for example.
In fact the two subjects whom we have given as giving the reaction
did not really ask proper questions. One of them, while pointing
at the box named in E's speech, and without getting up, said, 'That
is the white one'. This was said in such a way which suggested
that the child wanted E to correct herself. The second child, doing
very much the same as the first (that is, pointing at the box named
in E's speech), and grinning mischievously in addition, said,
'It is in that one'.
The result probably supports other ones which have shown young
speech).
what her pointing implied. However, it is very surprising
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children to fail to ask questions spontaneously, when faced with
ambiguous messages in test situations. (See, for example,
Cosgrove and Patterson, 1977; and. Bearison and Levey, 19770
One possible reason for the behaviour in our own situation is that
the children knew or felt that E knew what she had done; that is,
they knew that her pointing in the opposite direction to her speech
was deliberate. This might have bewildered and inhibited or
incapacitated them.
And incapacitated they were. Most of the children looked
shocked or very surprised. A few even looked very disturbed.
However, even though they did not voice questions, the facial
expressions and eye-movements of many were indicative of questions.
Silent eye-trips were made from the box pointed at to E, and then
to the box named in E's speech.
Nevertheless, the main point of the reactions shown is that
our subjects did not only understand what the experimenter said,
they also understood the implications of her pointing. The
eventual searching of one of the boxes, therefore, was undoubtedly
the outcome of a hard and forced choice.
Contrary to what the results of the experiments reported in
chapter 1+ will lead us to expect, all but two of the subjects acted
on the basis of what the experimenter said; that is, they chose to
search the box named in her speech rather than the one which she
pointed at (Table 6 (b)). The experiment was repeated with a
different group of 11+ children and the same result as before was
obtained. Twelve out of the fourteen children acted on the basis
of what the experimenter said. These results suggest that where
lexical terms with more definite interpretations are involved,
young children do not give preferential weight to situational
suggestions. It follows that we must give serious consideration
to the nature of the key terms used in Piagetian concrete-




General Discussion of the Experiments
This chapter reviews the experiments reported in chapters 1|, $
and 6. We shall consider first the experiments in chapter and we
shall begin the discussion by going over some of the results from
Experiment 1+. 1.
We saw in that experiment how many of the young subjects given
the tower-building task (treatment condition) gave what we have termed
'Yes-responses' in reply to the critical question put to them. In
contrast to the young 'treatment' subjects, only two of the young
subjects who received a different condition (no counting of cylinders)
gave the Yes-response. These results were taken as evidence that the
experimenter's counting in the treatment condition was responsible for
the Yes-responses given. The results, together with failure of all
adult subjects tested to give Yes-responses, were taken as suggesting
that young children give more weight to situational suggestions than
others do when responding to test questions.
Not only did we see that most of the young treatment subjects gave
Yes-responses, we also saw that many of these responses were of the kind
which we said would ordinarily be judged as indicating failure to think
of the blocks in the task. This result was taken as suggesting that
young children may fail on Piagetian concrete-operations tasks because
they give considerable weight to what situations suggest about the
experimenter's meaning for the critical questions asked.
We went on to consider the possibility that our young subjects
might actually have failed to attend to what the experimenter said about
the blocks in the task. This possibility was rejected largely on
account of an argument that giving weight to the situational assumption
about using the cylinders, as our subjects did, necessarily entailed
taking account of what the experimenter said about the blocks.
We also considered the possibility that our subjects might not
have given significant weight to the suggestion about using the
cylinders when interpreting the critical question. We could not
adduce adequate evidence against this possibility; at least not
empirical evidence. Since the whole point of our testing and
conclusions depended on a correct view of this, the second and third
experiments reported in chapter 1+ were devoted to the resolution of
this problem.
In the second and third experiments reported in chapter i|, unlike
the first one, it was not expected that the subjects would assume that
the material acted upon by the experimenter would be used. We, there¬
fore, did not expect young subjects in the latter experiments to give
Yes-responses, if indeed the suggestion about using the cylinders was
directly responsible for the responses in the first one.
The results from the second experiment did not provide a strong
support for the position that the suggestion about using the cylinders
was responsible for the responses in the first experiment. However,
there seemed to be a good explanation for this equivocal outcome.
Moreover, the results from the third experiment did provide a clear
statistically significant support for the position.
The fourth experiment reported in chapter ij. was concerned with
whether the young subjects tested in the other experiments were
influenced by the situational suggestion partly because it was
induced just prior to the critical question. We did not find
evidence for any such recency effect.
The results of the different experiments taken together will
suggest that young children may fail on Piagetian concrete-operations
tests because they give substantial weight to situational assumptions
when responding to the critical questions.
Experiment 1+.1 was repeated with a different group of young
children and roughly the same results as before were obtained. This
helped further to confirm our findings. However, there is an
important aspect of the results which is yet unexplained. This is
why the failure-response ('Yes, there are some of them') was more
common than the other kind of Yes-response ('Yes, there are some
cylinders but no blocks'). The two responses, as we explained in the
introduction to Experiment I|..1, are borne out of giving a lot of
weight to the suggestion about using the cylinders. If this weighting
alone can account for the responses, it would be expected that the
chances of getting one of them should be about equal the chances of
getting the other. An additional explanation must, therefore, be
sought for the uneven distribution of the responses in our results.
We feel that the necessary additional explanation may come from
the fact that the failure-response is unelaborated or brief. (This
is comparing it with the other kind of Yes-response). There is
evidence that young children tend not to give spontaneous elaborated
responses in test situations. This evidence comes mainly from
investigations of the ability to communicate effectively. In many
such studies, a task is given which requires the child to use
language to pick out a particular referent for a second child or
adult who acts as his listener. The referent is presented along
with one or more other referents. A particularly interesting
example is provided by the work of Robinson (1978).
In the study, a number of cards showing drawings of different
men were presented. One card, for example, had a man with a blue
flag, a red flower, a tall hat, boots and a smile. Another card
had a man with a blue flag, red flower, short hat, boots and a
smile. In another card, the man shown had a blue flag again, but
a blue flower this time, a short hat as in the second card (but not
the first), shoes instead of boots, and a smile. The men shown on
the other cards wore sad faces. However, the important thing was
that the drawings were picked such that, identifying any one of them
for a listener who holds an identical set (but could not see the
identifying card), would require an elaborated message.
The children involved in the study were aged between 5 years
7 months and 6 years 2 months. Many of the younger children gave
only veiy general descriptions at first. With certain probing
questions, however, the children's performance improved. (it
should be noted that Hobinson was more interested in the reason why
the children failed to communicate effectively (that is, their
understanding of good and bad messages), and not so much in the
fact that they failed in this way).
A related study to Robinson's was that of Krauss and Glucksberg
(7969)• In this case, the child had to identify one of six blocks
for another child separated from him by a screen. The children in
the study were aged between about 5> years and 11 years. All the
age groups recorded very bad (ineffective) communication initially,
but the performance of the older subjects improved over the trials
while that of the younger ones remained poor. So, as in Robinson's
study, the children in this study did not say enough to help their
listeners decide on what they really meant. (Krauss and
Glucksberg's study has some serious methodological drawbacks.
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These have been discussed by Harris, Macrae and Basset (1978) for
example. We feel that what could be a more serious problem with
the study is the assumption that young children are not capable of
elaborated communication in such situations; an assumption which
Robinson did not make, and which has not always received empirical
support. See, also, Ford and Olson, 1975)-
In many studies related to the two mentioned above, it is
common to give the child two referents (words), and to ask him to
think of a third word which would help his hidden listener to
identify a particular one of the two referents. (Glucksberg, Krauss
and Weisberg, 1966; Cohen and Klein, 1968; Asher and Oden, 1978).
In these cases too, where giving elaborated messages is less relevant,
young children have been found to communicate ineffectively.
To return to our own experiments, the result that many of our
young subjects gave the failure-response may be likened to the
behaviour found in the communication studies cited. But why do the
children behave in this way? Do they do so partly because they
give a large weight to situational suggestions?
Until quite recently, it was common to explain young children's
apparent communicative incompetence as resulting from an inability
to conceive the informational needs of their listeners. This idea
was originated by Piaget (1926). Now many investigators have been
considering alternative explanations for the apparent incompetence,
and new evidence does suggest that whatever problems the children
have, it is not the case that they are incapable of taking account
of their listeners' informational needs.
Robinson's (1978) investigation, for example, led her to
suggest that children may fail to give as much information as
required because of an ignorance about the requirements of the
communication tasks. She also adduced evidence to the effect that
the everyday experiences of the children do not help to tune them
to an awareness of such requirements.
Asher and Oden (1976), on the other hand, suggest that children's
difficulty might arise from a failure to compare the associative
strength of potential messages to the referent and non-referent.
(See also Bearison and Levey, 1977)- This explanation is different
from Robinson's but the two do not contradict each other. In fact,
they can be taken together, with Robinson's adding importantly to
that of Asher and Oden.
But what bearing do these explanations have on our own results?
While there is really no question of comparison, or referent and
non-referent in our experiments (at least from the point of view of
the children), it is quite possible that they did not recognize the
need to be explicit in their responses. This, in part, may explain
the failure-response. This additional explanation is still within
the domain of the main one which we have put forward. The need to
be explicit might elude the children, partly because they take
certain kinds of situational information into account, and because
they assume this is accessible to others. Particularly relevant in
this respect is a finding made by Blank (197S)•
Blank (1975) found that removing from view objects which
children have to describe makes a significant difference to their
descriptive behaviour. When the objects were within view, the
children resorted to gestural communication like pointing to pick out
one of them for their listener. When the objects were removed from
view, on the other hand, the children gave more verbal information
about them. Blank explained that young children are comfortable
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with the system of gestures, and would, therefore, resort to it
whenever circumstances make it possible. She concluded that the
behavioural preference could lead investigators to underestimate
the child's potential verbal skills.
That Blank's subjects communicated verbally with more effect in
the 'objects-removed' situation was an indication that they were more
capable of effective communication than they might show. It also
indicated that part of the problem for them in the'objects-present'
situation was that they were ignorant of the need for them to give
explicit verbal responses. But most important of all, the results
constituted evidence that young children's behaviour in test
situations is very much governed by their appraisal of the entire
situation. The 'objects-present' situation might have aided the
ignorance of Blank's subjects, but at the same time, it is
suggested that they based their responses on the assumptions about
the situation, and about the interrogator (experimenter);
specifically, about what he can and cannot see.
There is some evidence to suggest that this kind of explanation
applies in the case of our own experiments.
It was observed during testing that subjects who gave the
failure-response lifted the box of cylinders onto the table. It would
have been assumed then that the experimenter could see for herself
that the box contained no blocks. If this should have been the
case, then there would have been little or no need (from the child's
point of view) to specify that there were no blocks. It would have
been enough simply to answer 'Yes' or 'Yes, there are some of them'.
The subjects who gave No-responses, on the other hand, very
rarely lifted the box of cylinders. These observations only add to
the evidence that young children are very active interpreters, and
relatively alert in test situations. They may not do things correctly
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but they cannot be accused of mental passivity. It would seem that,where
given the opportunity, they take every situational facet into account.
It is worth pointing out in this regard that for many of the children
given the tower task, it took some time before they were able to make
up their minds about whether to use the blocks or the cylinders when
asked to choose at the very beginning of the task. It was discovered
from some of the children that this delay was caused by the fact that
while they saw the blocks as the more common objects used for
building towers, they also saw the cylinders as being available in a
greater number. In fact, a few of the children had prolonged
arguments with the experimenter over this issue. These children, it
was discovered later, were the ones who were more talkative, and/or
who displayed considerable independence and precocity in the play
groups. We should mention that the initial arguments with the
experimenter did not seem to have any effects on the responses of the
few children concerned. Some of them went on to take the critical
question as a reference to the blocks alone and others took it as a
reference to the cylinders as well.
To return to our main point, however, young children do not only
make decisions about the use to which objects will be put, they also
tahe account of what the experimenter can see. This has important
implications for those tests in which it is necessary to have great
control over the child's reading of the tests. However, the
observations are probably what we should expect. Children's
cognitive processes are still undergoing development. They are
still in the process of trying to comprehend many things. It is
natural that they should undertake as exhaustive interpretations as they can.
It is interesting to note that the responses of the adult
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subjects on our task were as brief as those of the young children.
But then, one has to take account of the fact that the interpretation
which they gave did not really warrant an elaborated reply. It can
be argued that if a subject sees the critical question as referring
to the blocks alone as they did, there is little need for him to
utter much more than 'No'. In other words, there is no real need
for him to mention the cylinders, and come out with a response like,
'No, there are none of them (blocks), but there are some cylinders'.
So far, our discussion has been concerned with the results of
the experiments reported in chapter 1+. The experiment reported in
chapter 5 compared performance on the Conservation test with
performance on the Tower-building test. The comparison study was
conducted to test our assumption that children respond to the
conservation question in the same way that they respond to the critical
question in the tower task. As we saw, the results provided ample
support for the assumption.
In the experiment reported in chapter 6 we tried to find out
what young children did where the expressions to be interpreted have
more determinate referents than the deictic term used in the tower
task or the quantitative term used in the conservation question.
The results of the experiment revealed that children do not give
pieferential weight to situational suggestions in such circumstances.
Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusions
We shall give a brief summary of the preceding chapters, and then
try to draw some general conclusions from the experimental findings
reported in chapters I4., 5 and 6.
SnmTna.-i-y
The thesis has been concerned with the explanation for young
children's failure on Piagetian concrete-operations tests. The
issue is of considerable importance because it relates directly to
the process by which a child becomes capable of concrete-operational
thinking.
We have investigated a claim that young children may fail on the
tests because they are misled about the reference of the critical
questions by the non-verbal communicative contexts.
We noted that when sentences are spoken in everyday life, what
we strive to grasp is the message which the speaker intends to
communicate by uttering the sentences, and not what the sentences
ordinarily mean (linguistic sentence meaning). The message which
a sentence is understood to carry, we added, is partly determined
by the context of utterance. Furthermore, we commonly assign greater
weight to what the context of an utterance suggests about a speaker's
message than we assign to what the linguistic sentence meaning
suggests. This results in what may be called non-literal interpre¬
tations as opposed to literal interpretations which are constructed
primarily on the basis of linguistic sentence meaning and which may
require more work cognitively. At the same time as messages depend
in part on context of utterance, there are some linguistic expressions
like deictics, prepositions, and quantifiers which have no meaning on
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their own and can only be interpreted within a particular context.
The context may be verbal or non-verbal or both. However, the
reference or criterion indicated in one context may lack correspondence
with that indicated in the other context. In such instances, the
verbally-indicated reference may be described as the literal meaning
and the non-verbally indicated reference as the non-literal meaning.
It was suggested that young children might be in the habit of
giving only non-literal interpretations to test instructions. Where,
as is bound to happen sometimes, these interpretations do not correspond
with intended literal interpretation of experimenter's meaning, the
children will be misled about the reference of the test instructions
and will give incorrect responses based on the incorrect interpretat¬
ions.
In chapter 2, we tried to account for young children giving only
non-literal interpretations; particularly those based on the
situational (extralinguistic and paralinguistic) aspects of utterance-
contexts. The claims that the children depend on their sensitivity
to situations for the development and the use of language were
discussed. It was suggested that such dependence could cause
children to have more faith in situational clues than others do when
processing utterances and, therefore, to find it difficult to reduce
the weight attached to such clues.
In chapter 3> we reviewed studies by McGarrigle and Donaldson
(1975) and. McGarrigle et al (1978) who proposed that situational clues
cause young children to give incorrect interpretations and incorrect
responses in the Conservation and Class Inclusion tests respectively.
It became apparent during the review that explanations other than the
ones given by the authors could be offered for their results.
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The experiments reported in chapter I4 were designed to further
investigate the new account employing a test which was new hut which
was similar to one of the Piagetian tests (Conservation test) in
design. The young children studied behaved in the manner prescribed
by the new account of their failure, giving considerable weight to
what the situation of the test suggested about the experimenter's
intention for the critical question asked. The results of the
experiment in chapter 5 provided support for our assumption that
children's manner of responding in the new test is comparable with
their manner of responding in the Conservation test. The results of
the experiment reported in chapter 6, for its part, showed that young
children do not assign preferential weight to situational suggestions
where the expressions to be interpreted have relatively determinate
reference. This indicated that the children might have difficulty
in dealing with the key expressions used in the Tower test and the
conservation question.
Conclusions
Our conclusions must hinge on the account of why children go from
giving Yes-responses on the Tower test to giving No-responses on the
test. In giving such an account, we shall be speculating on the
change from non-conserving responses to conserving responses.
The results obtained in chapter 6 make it clear that it is not
that children simply move from a stage where they fail to attend
adequately to language to a stage where they attend to it. It will
appear that the change(s) which take place are much more subtle than
that. We cannot suggest either, that what happens is that children
move from a stage where they lack awareness of the indeterminacy
of the reference of deictic terms to a stage where they acquire this
awareness. As we noted in the discussion of Experiment l+.l, the data
from the Tower test indicated that even the young subjects who gave
the shorter version of the Yes-response knew perfectly well that the
critical question could refer to the blocks (verbally-indicated) as
well as the cylinders (non-verbally-indicated).
At the same time as being aware of the indeterminacy of the
reference of the deictic term in the Tower test, the children tested
seemed quite happy with this indeterminacy. This can be seen from
the fact that they did not appear to be bothered by it and only very
few asked the experimenter which item was the reference of the term.
This, of course, is not to suggest that the children do not entertain
any doubts about deictics.
Rather than concluding that children who give the shorter Yes-
response do so because they think 'them' refers only to the non-
verbally indicated cylinders, we prefer to interpret this response in
terms of concealment of the more elaborated response. We propose that
the children are aware of the indeterminacy of the reference of the
term, but they have a tendency to give non-elaborated responses. A
more elaborated response than the kind recorded from many of the
children would have made it clearer that the blocks as well were seen
as one reference of the deictic term.
If we applied this account that young children are aware of the
indeterminacy of deictics to the Conservation test, we will propose
that the children may judge its quantitative term 'more' on the basis
of a variety of attributes which may well also include attention to
quantity. It is possible that in the same way as for the Tower test,
this awareness is not reflected in their responses largely because the
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children choose to give the less informative non-elaborated kind, of
responses. The kind, of elaborated response which one would, expect
the children to give if the theory were correct that they judge also
on the basis of quantity is 'There is more (length) there, but this
one has more (number)'. (This example is for the number task).
McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975) did not make this same suggestion in
their account.
However, we do realize while offering the above theory that it
has to be investigated further and that will pose several problems.
When the child gives the correct pre-transformation judgement of the
two lots of material on the Conservation test, it does not follow that
he compares the two lots on the basis of their quantities. In the
number test, for example, the child may equally well compare only on
the basis of length and density to arrive at the correct pre-
transformation judgement.
We are yet to consider why children go on to give No-responses on
the Tower test. At this juncture, we may turn to some of the
findings made by Karmiloff-Smith (1979)- She found that at about the
age of 5 years, children begin to give evidence of being truly aware
of the different functions which the definite and indefinite articles
may serve; for example, to focus attention on a number of objects
together, to name a plurality of objects, to focus attention on an
object in the extralinguistic setting. Moreover, children at this
age begin to use a separate morpheme for each function that they wish
to convey. In other words, the children enter into a phase when they
restrict the meaning which different morphemes can convey. This
procedure is a marked contrast to what children of 8 years and above do.
The older group manage to indicate several functions with one word.
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The change towards restriction at 5 years may help explain the change
towards No-responses on the Tower test at about this age. It could be
that children enter into a phase when they no longer feel happy about
the indeterminacy of deictic terms, and whey they prefer to restrict
the reference to only one object. This explanation, however, does not
tell us why reference should be restricted to a verbally-indicated
object in particular. Here, we may turn to the ideas put forward by
Donaldson (1978).
Donaldson (1978) reckons that children go from a stage where they
lack awareness of language as a system in its own right to a stage
where they gain this awareness. Such increasing appreciation of the
potential independence of language may contribute to the development
of a preference for verbally-indicated reference for deictics and,
consequently, a decrease in reliance on non-verbal aspects. It is
worth pointing out Donaldson's hypothesis that the process of learning
to read and write contributes to the growth of awareness of language.
This process is initiated at about the age of 9 years. The main
reason for this hypothesis surrounds the special nature of and demands
of written language, as opposed to spoken language. (See, also,
Donaldson (1977)). Written language is relatively abstracted from
concrete situations and from the directly perceptible needs and motives
of others. This quality creates the need for what is written to be
relatively self-sufficient; that is, to be explicit and detailed.
In the attempt to achieve these requirements, the individual is
forced to become more aware of language as a tool and some of the
factors which determine our customary employment of it. At the same
time, awareness of what one does when one interprets utterances
ordinarily is promoted. As Vygotsky (19^2) observed, even the
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minimal development of writing requires a high level of abstraction.
In his comments on the differences between the nature and demands of
written and spoken language, Vygotsky wrote:
"In conversation, every sentence is prompted by a
motive. Desire or need lead to request, question
to answer, bewilderment to explanation. The
changing motives of the interlocutors determine
at every moment the turn oral speech will take.
It does not have to be consciously directed - the
dynamic situation takes care of that. The motives
for writing are more abstract, more intellectualized,
further removed from immediate needs. In written
speech, we are obliged to create the situation, to
represent it to ourselves. This demands detachment
from the actual situation."
Vygotsky, 1962, p. 99.
The question for us at this stage is whether the foreoing account
sheds light on the transition from non-conserving responses to
conserving responses on the Conservation test. In so far as the
quantitative term in the conservation question behaves like a deictic
term, the answer to this question could be yes. If this should be a
correct evaluation, it will mean that children move from a stage where
they are relatively happy with the indeterminacy of the quantitative
term 'more' but fail to make their awareness of the indeterminacy known,
giving only non-elaborated responses which rely heavily on non-verbally
indicated reference, to a stage where they prefer to restrict themselves
to a single criterion for judging the term and rely less on non-verbally
indicated criteria.
However, in so far as it is open to argument whether or not young
children who give non-conserving responses are aware of quantity as a
potential criterion for judging the conservation question, one who is
sceptical may contest the idea that conserving responses are arrived at
through a process of restriction to a verbally-indicated criterion. A
Piagetian investigator, on his part, while he may agree that non-
conservers do not approach the term 'more' in the same manner as
conservers do, may argue that the overriding determinant in the
change is the increasing presence of the conservation ability.
Where the ability is present in the child, it will be argued, the
ability should help direct him to quantity. In other words, we need
not appeal to the notions of restriction and increasing awareness of
language. If one takes this alternative account, one will be faced
with the problem of reconciling it with the change on the Tower test
from Yes-responses to No-responses and the relationship between this
change and the change on the Conservation test. If the change from
Yes-responses to No-responses could be due to a restriction of
reference and awareness of language, and if performance on the Tower
test matches relatively well with performance on the Conservation
test, what stops it from being the case that the change on the
Conservation test is due to a restriction of criteria and awareness
of language? Conservation ability cannot explain change on the
Tower test.
We would suggest that the explanation proposed here for the
relationship is the more economical.
APPENDIX A
Notes
For most psychologists, including Piaget, the average adult is
the same as the average formally educated or intellectually
sophisticated adult. The same qualification goes for the idea
of the average child - this child "belongs to a literate Western
Society and is at a certain level of formal schooling.
The same finding was made "by McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes (1978).
An important exception is the imitation of other's actions which
Piaget did consider as being very important for the emergence
of symbolic representation in general.
Towards the end of his life, Piaget was beginning to alter his
views. Moore and Harris (1978) report that in a preface to
Ferreiro (1971> in French), Piaget suggested two options on
the relationship between language and thought. One was his
traditional view. The other was that one might see a parallel
development in the linguistic and cognitive domain, with different
levels of operativity accountable through decalage. He suggested
that decoding linguistic structure and solving various cognitive
tasks are parallel problems to which the child brings epistemo-
logical strategies.
Some of the research which has been carried out on non-verbal
communication is of relevance here. See, for example, Argyle
(1972).
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6. It has to he said at this point that investigators have not all
been blind to the fact that the situations of formal tests may-
have undesired effects on the performance of their younger
subjects. This is most evident in the care which is always
taken in designing such tests to be as simple as possible within
the experimental requirements. However, it seems that the same
investigators have tended to assume that even where the non-
literal interpretation of the instruction given differs from the
more literal interpretation, subjects, knowing this, will normally
give the literal interpretation.
7- It should be noted that Donaldson and her colleagues, even at the
time of the studies, gave attention to the nature of the normal
referential contexts of the relational terms.
8. We do recognize that 'failure' in the new task is not equivalent
to failure in Piagetian concrete-operations tests.
9. We all know how we sometimes get carried off the point of a task
by insignificant distractions, and we may lose touch completely,
at least temporarily, with what we were doing before the
distraction occurred. It is generally believed that younger
children are more prone than older ones to this kind of influence.
The act introduced by the experimenter here was intended to have
just that kind of effect on subjects. It had on the face of it,
nothing to do with what the experimenter said about building with
blocks, and it was the kind of act that can readily take up the
subject's attention. It should be noted that the items which
subjects might forget was what the experimenter said about building
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with the blocks. Since the blocks were present on the table all
the time, they would not be forgotten.
10. The experimenter's counting might, for example, make subjects
forget about the blocks without redirecting them to think of the
cylinders. In such a case the response could be something like,
"What?".
11. Where a subject indicated that he had never tried to build towers
(though this could be insincere), the experimenter tried to
reassure him that it was not a difficult thing to do, adding that
she would teach him if necessary.
12. Surely, many subjects, especially the adults, could have recognized
that the experimenter knew of the presence of this second box.
But we expected that they would not recognize the true position for
the task at least. This was to find out whether they would take
the situational assumption into account. Once this is not
recognized, a thought that the experimenter knew of the box under
their chair should not have any important effects on subjects'
responses.
13* It is necessary to note here that whatever assumption is made about
the experimenter's counting is likely to be one that the cylinders
will be used for the towers. Whether or not it will be assumed
that two separate tasks (one with the blocks, the other with the
cylinders) will be carried out is really beside the point. This
is because it is still accepted that the cylinders will be used.
The tower task necessitated that the materials he laid out
before the child entered the testing room. Under such
circumstances, the conservation task could not have been given
first in the same testing session. An alternative would have
been to give the tests in different rooms. This was, however,
not possible as the children's schools were short of space.
Where a subject responded in the negative, he was assured that
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